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As for privacy in general, it is difficult to see how a pooling equilibrium
is avoided in which privacy is ‘voluntarily’ surrendered, making the legal protection of privacy futile.†
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INTRODUCTION
Every day that Tom Goodwin drives his Chevy Tahoe, his insurance
company uses a small electronic monitor in his car to track his total driving
time, speed, and driving habits. If he drives less than ten thousand hours a
year, does not drive much after midnight, and avoids frequently slamming
on the brakes, at the end of the year he receives up to twenty-five percent
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I thank Ryan Calo, Danielle
Citron, Vic Fleischer, Paul Ohm, and Phil Weiser for their feedback on this project, as well as the participants in the University of Colorado School of Law’s faculty workshop. I thank Mark Gibson and Matt
Burns for their excellent research assistance.
† Richard Posner, Privacy, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS & THE LAW 103,
107 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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off his premiums. “There’s this ‘Big Brother’ thing, but it’s good,” Goodwin says. “Since I know I’m being watched, I’m on my best behavior.”1
To date, Progressive Insurance’s MyRate program is available in forty
states and has enrolled roughly ten thousand customers.2 Other insurance
companies are following suit.3 Some carriers go even further, offering discounts for the use of more sophisticated devices that record geographical
location, minute-by-minute speeding violations, and seat belt usage.4 Rental car companies have also experimented with using such monitors to incentivize safe driving.
Similarly, the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, uses remote monitoring devices every day to check up on the health of residents at Charter
House, a nearby senior living center. The devices transmit data about irregular heart rhythms, breathing rates, and the patients’ positions and motions. “The goal,” says Dr. Charles Bruce, an investigator on the project,
“is to have full remote monitoring of people . . . just like you measure the
pressure of your tires today.”5 Medical device companies are racing to enter the remote monitoring space. Proteus Biomedical, for example, is testing a wearable electronic device that can sense when patients have taken
their pills and transmit that information to the patients’ doctors.6 GlySens is
working on an implantable subcutaneous blood sugar sensor for diabetics
that uses wireless communication that could be used to constantly send realtime results to their doctors.7 FitBit, BodyMedia, Toumaz, and other com1

Bengt Halvorson, Car Insurance Savings Come with ‘Big Brother,’ CNN (May 22, 2009, 9:28
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/wayoflife/05/22/aa.pay.as.drive.insurance.
2
The program was recently renamed Snapshot and updated slightly. See Snapshot Discount,
PROGRESSIVE.COM, http://www.progressive.com/myrate (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
3
Many insurance providers offer similar discounts, sometimes of up to sixty percent off regular
premiums. See Jilian Mincer, To Your Benefit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2009, at R10 (discussing various
plans). GMAC Insurance, for example, uses OnStar data to track total miles driven. See The GMAC
Insurance Low-Mileage Discount, GMAC INS., http://www.gmac123.com/auto-insurance/smartdiscounts/low-mileage-discount.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
4
See Parents Help Keep Teen Drivers Safe with DriveSmart, ANPAC, http://www.anpac.com/
DriveSmart/WhatIsDriveSmart/FAQ/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). Intel is working on more
sophisticated monitoring systems for cars akin to the “black boxes” in aircraft, capable of recording and
transmitting basic vehicle telemetry, seat belt usage, geographical location, mechanical malfunctions,
and video of auto accidents, all of which would be of great interest to an insurance carrier. See John R.
Quain, Intel Working on Black Box for Your Car, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://wheels.
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/intel-working-on-black-box-for-your-car. Last year, Congress introduced legislation to make such event recorders mandatory in all new cars. See Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 2010, S. 3302, 111th Cong. § 107. For discussion of the privacy implications of such technologies, see Patrick R. Mueller, Comment, Every Time You Brake, Every Turn You Make—I’ll Be Watching
You: Protecting Driver Privacy in Event Data Recorder Information, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 135.
5
Steven Rogerson, The Mayo Clinic Trials Health’s New Big Brother, MEDICALDEVICENETWORK.COM (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.medicaldevice-network.com/features/feature81227.
6
See Don Clark, Take Two Digital Pills and Call Me in the Morning, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2009, at
A6.
7
See Keith Darcé, S.D. Company Hopes Monitor Will Revolutionize Diabetes Care, SIGN ON SAN
DIEGO (July 28, 2010, 9:13 PM), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/jul/28/sd-company-hopes-
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panies market devices that track physical activity, calories burned, sleep habits, and other data.8 Although today these devices do not report data to users’ health insurers, it would be a simple step for a patient to provide such
access in return for a discount. Indeed, the health care community is already discussing such “pervasive lifestyle incentive management.”9
Finally, tenants, job applicants, and students voluntarily disclose verified personal information to their prospective landlords, employers, and
universities every day using online services such as MyBackgroundCheck.com.10 Rather than forcing these entities to run a background check,
an applicant can digitally divulge pre-verified information such as criminal
record, sex offender status, eviction history, and previous rental addresses.
Moreover, these services allow an applicant to augment her resume by having verified drug testing done at a local collection site and added to her
digital record. MyBackgroundCheck.com calls this feature “resume enhancement.”11
This Article makes three claims. First, these examples—Tom Goodwin’s car insurance, pervasive health monitoring, and the incorporation of
verified drug testing into one’s “enhanced resume”—illustrate that rapidly
changing information technologies are making it possible for consumers to
share verified personal information at low cost for economic reward or, put
differently, for firms to extract previously unavailable personal information
from individuals by offering economic incentives. In this world, economic
actors do not always need to “sort” or screen each other based on publicly
available information; instead, they can incentivize each other to “signal”
their characteristics. For example, an insurance company does not need to
do extensive data mining to determine whether a person is a risky driver or
an unusual health risk—it can extract that information from the insured directly. Second, this change towards a “signaling economy,” as opposed to
the “sorting economy” in which we have lived since the late 1800s, poses a
very different threat to privacy than the threats of data mining, aggregation,
monitor-will-revolutionize. There are already regular finger-prick blood sugar monitors that transmit
such data electronically after each reading. See Products—IDEAL LIFE Gluco Manager™, IDEAL LIFE,
http://www.ideallifeonline.com/products/glucomanager (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
8
See FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) (selling Fitbit Tracker); Home—
SenseWear, BODYMEDIA, INC., http://sensewear.bodymedia.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (marketing
the BodyMedia SenseWear system); Toumaz—Sensium Introduction, TOUMAZ, http://www.
toumaz.com/page.php?page=sensium_intro (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (describing the Toumaz Sensium
platform for real-time body monitoring).
9
See, e.g., Upkar Varshney, Pervasive Healthcare and Wireless Health Monitoring, 12 MOBILE
NETWORKS & APPLICATIONS 113, 115 (2007) (“Pervasive lifestyle incentive management could involve
giving a small mobile micro-payment to a user device every time the user exercises or eats healthy
food.” (emphasis omitted)).
10
See MYBACKGROUNDCHECK.COM, http://www.mybackgroundcheck.com (last visited Jan. 30,
2012).
11
See Schedule a Drug Test for Yourself and Share the Results, MYBACKGROUNDCHECK.COM,
http://www.mybackgroundcheck.com/DrugTesting.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).
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and sorting that have preoccupied the burgeoning field of informational privacy for the last decade. In a world of verifiable information and low-cost
signaling, the game-theoretic “unraveling effect” kicks in, leading selfinterested actors to fully disclose their personal information for economic
gain. Although at first consumers may receive a discount for using a driving or health monitor, privacy may unravel as those who refuse to disclose
are assumed to be withholding negative information and therefore stigmatized and penalized. Third, privacy law and scholarship must reorient towards this unraveling threat to privacy. Privacy scholarship is unprepared
for the possibility that when a few people have the ability and incentive to
disclose, everyone may ultimately be forced to do so. The field has had the
luxury of ignoring unraveling because technologies did not exist to make a
signaling economy possible. Those days are over. As the signaling economy emerges, privacy advocates must either concede defeat or focus on
preventing unraveling. The latter requires both a theoretical shift in our
conception of privacy harms and practical changes in privacy reform strategies.
This Article addresses these claims in its three parts. Part I explores
the emerging signaling economy. In the signaling economy, individuals
and firms can extract verified, high-quality, low-cost data from each other
directly rather than searching through mountains of unverified, low-quality
information. Developments in information technology make information
increasingly verifiable, and thus increasingly valuable as signals, especially
in situations in which there is information asymmetry. I propose a simple
metaphor to capture the extreme possibilities of this signaling economy: the
“personal prospectus.” The personal prospectus would be a compilation of
an individual’s verified private information about himself: a digital repository containing the data collected from the sensors and drug tests in the previous examples, or from the many other innovative monitors undoubtedly
around the corner, as well as information from one’s bank accounts, educational records, tax history, criminal history, immigration records, health
records, and other private sources. It might include one’s eBay Feedback
score or Klout score.12 In short, it would be the aggregate of all of one’s
private tests, records, and history in a single massive digital resume, shareable with others at the click of a button. The personal prospectus provides a
useful means to explore the limits and possibilities of this new signaling
economy, and it also illustrates the shortcomings of existing privacy law
and scholarship.
Part II takes up the Article’s second claim: that even the first steps that
we are now taking towards a signaling economy pose a new set of privacy
12

EBay Feedback scores measure the satisfaction of one’s prior transaction partners. See How
Feedback Works, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/Feedback/howitworks.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2012). A Klout score is a measure of one’s influence on various social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. See KLOUT, http://www.klout.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
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challenges previously largely ignored. Judge Richard Posner first articulated these challenges decades ago although at the time they seemed more
theoretical than practical.13 Even with control over her personal information, he argued, an individual will often find it in her self-interest to disclose
such information to others for economic gain. If she can credibly signal to
a health insurer that she does not smoke, she will pay lower premiums. If
she can convince her employer that she is diligent, she will receive greater
pay. As those with positive information about themselves choose to disclose, an “unraveling effect” will occur: in equilibrium, everyone will disclose their information, whether positive or negative, because disclosure by
those with the best private information leads to disclosure even by those
with the worst.
The classic example of unraveling imagines a buyer inspecting a crate
of oranges.14 The quantity of oranges in the crate is unknown, and opening
the crate before purchase is unwise because the oranges will rot before
transport. There are stiff penalties for lying, but no duty on the part of the
seller to disclose the number of oranges in the crate. The number of
oranges will be easy to verify once the crate is delivered and opened. The
buyer believes that there cannot be more than one hundred oranges.
The economic theory of unraveling posits that each seller will fully
disclose the number of oranges in her crate, regardless of how many it contains. Begin with the choice faced by a seller with one hundred oranges in
her crate. If the seller stays silent, the buyer will assume that there are fewer than one hundred oranges and will be unwilling to pay for the full
amount. The seller with one hundred oranges will therefore disclose and
charge full price. Now consider the choice of a seller with ninety-nine
oranges. If this seller stays quiet, the buyer will assume that there are fewer
than ninety-nine oranges and will discount accordingly. Because a silent
seller is pooled with every lower-value seller, staying silent works to his
disadvantage. He will therefore disclose.
And so it goes, until one reaches the seller with only one orange and
the unraveling is complete. As Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randal
Picker put it, “Silence cannot be sustained because high-value sellers will
distinguish themselves from low-value sellers through voluntary disclosure.”15 In his classic text, Passions Within Reason, economist Robert
Frank coined the term the “full disclosure principle” to describe this phenomenon. The principle is simple: “if some individuals stand to benefit by
13

Judge Posner’s clearest description of this problem is in Posner, supra note †, at 105–07. He began to develop these themes in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 234 (1981).
14
This example is drawn from S.J. Grossman & O.D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids,
35 J. FIN. 323, 324 (1980). It has been repeated since. E.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER
& RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 89–90 (1994) (using this example); Robert H.
Gertner, Disclosure and Unravelling, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS & THE
LAW, supra note †, at 605, 605 (same).
15
BAIRD, GERTNER & PICKER, supra note 14, at 90.
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revealing a favorable value of some trait, others will be forced to disclose
their less favorable values.”16
In the years since Posner’s challenge, however, privacy law has almost
entirely overlooked the threat of unraveling. Instead, recent informational
privacy scholarship17 has focused on the privacy threats from firms sorting
individuals by mining aggregated data such as credit histories. Informational privacy law has reacted to sorting becoming more commonplace and
sophisticated.18 The field is dominated by Daniel Solove’s concept of the
“digital dossier,” which is a metaphor for the aggregate of information
available in public and private databases about a given person.19 Privacy
scholars fear that we are moving towards a world in which everything becomes public and all of our personal information becomes easily available
to others as part of our digital dossier.20 Accordingly, the literature is filled
with calls to give individuals greater control21 over their personal information through the common law of property and tort and through stronger statutory privacy rights.22
The personal prospectus poses a different threat than Solove’s digital
dossier, however, and it demands different solutions than increased control
over one’s information. In a signaling economy, even if individuals have
control over their personal information, that control is itself the undoing of
their privacy. Because individuals hold the keys, they can be asked—or
forced—to unlock the door to their personal information. Those who refuse
to share their private information will face new forms of economic discrim16

ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 104 (1988).
See Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087 (2006) (reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON (2004)) (discussing the field of informational privacy
law).
18
See infra Part II.B.
19
See SOLOVE, supra note 17, at 1–2 (defining the digital dossier).
20
See Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as Personal Information Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 55–56 (2007) (demonstrating the ease of obtaining a digital
dossier on a person); John Palfrey, The Public and the Private at the United States Border with Cyberspace, 78 MISS. L.J. 241, 244 (2008) (discussing growth of the digital dossier); Lee Tien, Privacy, Technology and Data Mining, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 389, 398–99 (2004) (explaining the risks that digital
dossiers pose to privacy and associational freedom).
21
Control has been the dominant American definition of privacy. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (“Privacy . . . is
the control we have over information about ourselves.”); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890) (“The common law secures to each individual the
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”). Control is also the dominant prescribed remedy for privacy violation. See, e.g.,
Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000) (“The weight of
the consensus about the centrality of privacy-control is staggering.”); Sonja R. West, The Story of Us:
Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical Speech and Information Privacy, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 589, 606 (2010) (“[I]t is the control over the disclosure of information . . . that lies at the heart of
the legal protection for information privacy.”).
22
See infra Part II.B.
17
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ination. How long before one’s unwillingness to put a monitor in one’s car
amounts to an admission of bad driving habits, and one’s unwillingness to
wear a medical monitor leads to insurance penalties for assumed risky behavior? In a signaling economy, forced disclosure will be at least as difficult a problem as data mining and the digital dossier.
Consider another example: the unraveling strategy of Global Rainmakers, Inc. (GRI), a biometrics company currently engaged in a massive test
rollout of iris scanners across the city of Leon, Mexico.23 These scanners
cost roughly $50 to $100 per device. GRI is working with the city of Leon
to deploy thousands of scanners over several years to control access to medical centers, banks, public transportation, automatic teller machines, and
many other aspects of daily life. In the first stage of deployment, all convicted criminals will be required to submit for iris scanning. But GRI expects that others will quickly volunteer to take advantage of the
conveniences that the system affords.24 Ultimately, however, unraveling
may lead to full participation and full disclosure, even by those that might
at first hesitate for fear that their checkered personal histories will be used
to discriminate against them by, e.g., barring access to a mall or high-end
shop. As Jeff Carter, Chief Development Officer of GRI, put it, “When you
get masses of people opting-in, opting out does not help. Opting out actually puts more of a flag on you than just being part of the system. We believe
everyone will opt-in.”25 In other words, in a signaling economy, the stigma
of nondisclosure may be worse than the potential discriminatory consequences of full disclosure.
Part III thus attempts to reorient informational privacy law towards the
growing threats of signaling and unraveling. Unlike Judge Posner, however, I do not assume that unraveling necessarily leads to the end of privacy.
Instead, Part III explores both the economic conditions necessary for unraveling and the legal means available to constrain it. In particular, Part III
examines the three possible legal responses to the unraveling of privacy—
“don’t ask,” “don’t tell,” and “don’t use” rules—and explores their limitations and implications. I conclude that, although it is possible to constrain
the unraveling of privacy, it will require privacy advocates to move well
beyond their traditional focus on increasing individual control over information. Instead, the privacy field must wrestle directly with the problems
of paternalism inherent in limiting the use of information that at least some
consumers may want to disclose for economic advantage.26 Limiting blood
23

See Austin Carr, Iris Scanners Create the Most Secure City in the World. Welcome, Big Brother,
FAST COMPANY (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/1683302/iris-scanners-create-the-mostsecure-city-in-the-world-welcomes-big-brother.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
For an excellent discussion, see Anita L. Allen, Unpopular Privacy: The Case for Government
Mandates, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 87, 89–90 (2007), which discusses ways in which government requires unpopular privacy, such as regulating that erotic dancers wear pasties or G-strings despite their
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glucose monitoring by insurers may protect the privacy of the least healthy
diabetics who might otherwise be forced to disclose by the unraveling effect, but such limits would also impose costs on the most healthy and conscientious patients who would otherwise receive discounts for wearing a
glucose monitor. How will legislatures respond to consumer pressure for
the right to disclose? If to date the informational privacy field has been unable to muster legislative support even for increasing control over personal
data, how persuasive will it be when faced with these more difficult prescriptive debates?
Part III offers the first comprehensive exploration of these questions.
This discussion is timely, because as the signaling economy develops,
courts and legislatures are increasingly wrestling with these problems.27
The most prominent example is the recent health care bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).28 Incentive-based health insurance premiums were a central battleground in the give-and-take leading up
to the PPACA’s passage. The PPACA’s section 2705 increases the degree
to which employers and insurers can use discounts on health insurance
premiums to incentivize employees to participate in wellness programs and
to try to achieve specified personal health goals.29 Disease advocacy groups
fought for various limitations on the use of incentives,30 but privacy advocates were largely absent from the debate. The privacy field seems to have
assumed that the only privacy issues in the bill arose in the context of the
use and security of electronic health records.31 This is a mistake. Incentives
to signal raise exactly the questions to which informational privacy law
must turn: questions of justice, fairness, paternalism, and power; questions
about coercion and the limits of “voluntary” disclosure; questions, in short,
about how to deal with the threat of unraveling privacy.

belief that they could maximize profits through full disclosure. See also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR
PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2011).
27
Examples include litigation and legislation over the use of radio frequency identification tags, location-monitoring devices in rental cars, and health care incentives. See infra Part I.C.
28
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119.
29
Id. § 2705; see infra note 80–84 and accompanying text.
30
See Michael P. O’Donnell, Editor’s Notes, 24 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION, at iv, iv (2010).
31
Privacy advocates’ main focus has been on the privacy and security of electronic health records.
Comparatively little attention has been paid to the privacy issues implicit in incentive programs. See,
e.g., PATIENT PRIVACY RIGHTS, http://patientprivacyrights.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (illustrating
little discussion of incentive provisions by privacy advocates).
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THE PERSONAL PROSPECTUS AND THE EVOLUTION OF A SIGNALING
ECONOMY

A. Sorting and Signaling
It is often difficult to distinguish the trustworthy from the untrustworthy, the good from the bad, the high quality from the low. If you are choosing a business partner, you might value honesty and diligence, but you also
face the difficulty of determining whether your potential partner actually
has these traits or is just putting on a good show to lure you into the deal. If
you are purchasing a car, how do you determine whether it is dependable or
a lemon?32
These asymmetric information problems—how to distinguish one desirable “type” of people, goods, or assets from another less desirable type—
have occupied economists and legal scholars for decades. Consider the
simple decision of whether to lend money to Alice or Bob. If you could
easily determine that Alice is more creditworthy, you would choose to do
business with Alice and not Bob or, at least, to charge Bob a greater interest
rate than Alice. If you cannot so distinguish, however, you will either lend
to neither or charge both the higher interest rate because you must cover for
the possibility that both are of the undesirable type that is likely to default.33
This creates extra costs for Alice and Bob, inefficiencies for you, and a burden on the economy generally.34 If the market cannot absorb these costs,
creditworthy Alices may be priced out of the market completely.35
Sorting and signaling are the two primary economic devices to overcome such information asymmetries.36 Sorting, or “screening,” theory assumes that, if the desired characteristic is unobservable, an uninformed
party will filter counterparties based on what observable characteristics or
information is available.37 For example, a lender might use job turnover,
prior bankruptcies, or a poor credit score as proxies for future default risk.

32

See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
33
See generally Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and
Credit Rationing, 90 Q.J. ECON. 651, 651–52 (1976) (describing the dynamics of credit markets under
low-information conditions).
34
See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,
71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393–94 (1981).
35
See Akerlof, supra note 32, at 490–91.
36
For an overview of sorting and signaling, see John G. Riley, Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of
Screening and Signaling, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 432 (2001).
37
See, e.g., Roger Klein, Richard Spady & Andrew Weiss, Factors Affecting the Output and Quit
Propensities of Production Workers, 58 REV. ECON. STUD. 929 (1991) (exploring the example of employers sorting job applicants based on high school graduation as a proxy for perseverance).

1161

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Signaling is the counterpart to sorting.38 Economic actors use signals
to qualitatively distinguish themselves from other economic actors. Signaling “refers to actions taken by an informed party for the sole purpose of
credibly revealing his private information.”39 In our credit example, if there
are two types of borrowers seeking funds, Alice and Bob, and Alice is likely to pay back whereas Bob is not, Alice has incentive to reveal her trustworthiness to the lender to receive a lower interest rate.
Alice may try to signal her type by simply saying, “I am a good credit
risk—I will repay my loans,” but talk is cheap.40 The lender will doubt
Alice because Alice has every reason to lie. Moreover, because it is easy to
say such words, both Alice and Bob will say them, and the lender will be no
better off than it was before in trying to distinguish Alice from Bob. These
are the situations that incentivize lenders to mine for data and base lending
decisions on the basis of personal information that they can uncover about
borrowers.
To ensure that she gets the lower rate that she deserves in a signaling
economy, however, Alice may disclose information that can be used as a
proxy of future creditworthiness, such as her income level or employment
history. For such disclosure to be an effective signal, the disclosed information must be verifiable. Such verification has been costly in an economy
based on offline information.41 An economic actor seeking to rely on a
piece of information must expend time and resources to verify it by, for example, calling references, checking employment or tax records, or calling to
verify educational achievements. Although such steps are effective in some
38

See Michael Spence, Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction, 90 Q.J. ECON.
591, 592 (1976) (“[Signaling and sorting] are opposite sides of the same coin.”).
39
N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 487 (5th ed. 2009). Put differently, “adverse
selection may give rise to signaling, which is the attempt by the informed side of the market to communicate information that the other side would find valuable.” WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS 313
(5th ed. 2000).
40
See Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1996, at 103, 103–
05 (discussing cheap talk generally).
41
As a result, economists generally focus on signaling devices that are self-verifying by being costly to fake—whereby an action taken by Alice serves in and of itself as a signal of Alice’s type. See
MANKIW, supra note 39, at 487 (defining signaling). There are many examples. See, e.g., DIANE
COYLE, THE SOULFUL SCIENCE: WHAT ECONOMISTS REALLY DO AND WHY IT MATTERS 163 (rev. ed.
2010) (describing how Indian villagers borrow huge sums to pay for expensive weddings to signal their
caste and social status); Paul Herbig & John Milewicz, Market Signaling Behavior in the Service Industry, 1 ACAD. MARKETING STUD. J. 35, 39 (1997) (describing how banks and law firms spend vast sums
on elaborate office buildings to signal their quality and solvency to potential clients); Robert Puelz &
Arthur Snow, Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market, 102 J. POL. ECON. 236, 237 (1994) (describing how an insured chooses a highdeductible automobile insurance plan, thereby signaling their quality and low risk to the insurance company). Michael Spence began modern signaling theory in Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling,
87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973). See also Michael Spence, Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs, 90 Q.J. ECON. 51 (1976) (discussing his classic example of signaling through
educational achievement).
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instances, they impose costs. When signaling is cost-prohibitive, economic
actors will instead rely on sorting.
B. Sorting and the Digital Dossier
The “sorting economy” has developed over the last one hundred fifty
years as economic actors have been increasingly able to distinguish desirable counterparties by extracting and sorting information about them. Before
turning to the evolving signaling economy in section C, one must first understand the sorting economy and its culmination in today’s digital dossier.
The industrial economy had developed sophisticated sorting mechanisms long before the Internet made today’s data aggregation and data mining possible. Since the 1800s, the credit industry42 in particular has
aggregated and disseminated information about potential borrowers.43 Merchants and lenders evolved from knowing each other and their customers
personally44 to relying on merchant associations that exchanged reputational
information,45 to using in-house private investigators to assess trading partners,46 and ultimately to relying on the credit-reporting agencies that
emerged in the mid-1800s.47 Throughout the 1900s, the number of agencies
increased dramatically, and their information-sharing techniques grew more
sophisticated and comprehensive.48
By the 1970s and 1980s, computer technology made it far easier for
credit agencies to collaborate across geographic distances by sharing information, which gave rise to the small number of large credit agencies that

42

See Federico Ferretti, A Historical Primer on Consumer Credit Reporting Systems: A Lesson for
EU Policy Makers?, 12 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 92, 95 (2008) (describing how credit information
systems “represent an institutional response at the service of the credit industry to the problem of asymmetric information in financial markets”).
43
See John M. Barron & Michael Staten, The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports: Lessons
from the U.S. Experience, in CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 273
(Margaret J. Miller ed., 2003).
44
Ferretti, supra note 42, at 98 (“The small scale of trade in the US until the early nineteenth century had allowed traders to rely on personal ties or, in the event the seller did not know a prospective
buyer personally, on the experiences and opinions of other merchants.”); see also Josh Lauer, From Rumor to Written Record: Credit Reporting and the Invention of Financial Identity in Nineteenth-Century
America, 49 TECH. & CULTURE 301, 304, 306 (2008) (“[A]s many discovered, often through disaster,
the traditional way of assessing a credit-seeker’s trustworthiness—direct experience, word of mouth, and
letters of recommendation—proved increasingly unreliable.”).
45
See Lauer, supra note 44, at 302–03.
46
See Ferretti, supra note 42, at 99.
47
For excellent overviews of nineteenth-century credit-reporting systems, see JAMES D. NORRIS,
R.G. DUN & CO., 1841–1900: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT-REPORTING IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY (1978); ROWENA OLEGARIO, A CULTURE OF CREDIT: EMBEDDING TRUST AND
TRANSPARENCY IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (2006).
48
See Marco Pagano & Tullio Jappelli, Information Sharing in Credit Markets, 48 J. FIN. 1693,
1711–12 (1993).

1163

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

now dominate the American market.49 In turn, the Internet revolution of the
last twenty years allowed information aggregation to explode far beyond
the credit markets. It is difficult to overstate the pervasive nature of the data mining and aggregation that feed today’s digital dossiers.50 “Data collection is the dominant activity of commercial websites. Some 92 percent of
them collect personal data from web users, which they then aggregate, sort,
and use.”51 One scholar has estimated that corporate data mining links at
least seven thousand transactions to each individual in the United States per
year—approximately half a million transactions over a lifetime.52 Supermarkets, airlines, hotels, and merchants all track and share information
about consumers to better market their products.53 All of this comprises our
digital dossier.
The dominant purpose of this data mining and aggregation is predictive
profiling: creating models that can extrapolate from existing data to predict
future behavior.54 In other words, sorting. As Douglas Baird has argued
about lenders, for example,
Advances in data processing allow information about debtors to be collected
on a massive scale. It is now possible to look at a particular debtor, identify
characteristics such as age, marital status, education, and length of stay at current employer, compare that debtor with others for whom there is a credit history, and make a confident prediction about the likelihood that the debtor will
repay a loan.55

Beyond credit markets, corporations might explore correlations between
past consumer behavior and future purchases, such as whether a person who
49

Prior to the 1970s, the credit bureau industry had largely been fragmented into many local agencies. The onset of the computer revolution eliminated the efficiencies of having a local bureau as opposed to a larger, more regional or national agency, and led to consolidation in the credit agency
industry and the emergence of a few large national credit agencies. See id. at 1712 (“From a network of
local monopolies, credit bureaus began to evolve into a nationwide oligopoly.”).
50
Although the focus here is on data mining by private entities for economic purposes, it is worth
noting that governmental data mining and aggregation obviously pose serious risks to privacy. For a
discussion of governmental use of such data, see, for example, Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul
M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261 (2008).
51
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 219 (2006).
52
Jason Millar, Core Privacy: A Problem for Predictive Data Mining, in LESSONS FROM THE
IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 103, 105 (Ian Kerr
et al. eds., 2009); see also James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1464–65 (2004) (discussing the counterterrorism uses of commercial data
and data mining).
53
See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial
Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
595, 596 (2004) (discussing how opportunities for rent-seeking have caused corporations to undertake
data-collection efforts).
54
See Millar, supra note 52, at 106 (distinguishing descriptive from predictive data mining).
55
Douglas G. Baird, Technology, Information, and Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 312.
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had bought both Brand X and Brand Y will also buy Brand Z.56 An insurance company might use health records to predict life expectancy.57 An
employer might try to extrapolate the likelihood of future success as an employee from the tea leaves of a candidate’s past.58 A merchant might try to
predict whether a given customer’s check will bounce based on rudimentary
information about that check-writer.59
The digital dossier is thus the technological culmination of one hundred fifty years of increasingly sophisticated sorting. The upside is that
massive data aggregation and computer data analysis create market efficiencies because they allow parties to overcome information asymmetries
with greater accuracy and lower cost. The downside is the risk such techniques present to privacy.
Informational privacy scholars have trumpeted the dangers of the sorting made possible by the digital dossier:
We’re heading toward a world where an extensive trail of information fragments about us will be forever preserved on the Internet, displayed instantly in
a Google search. We will be forced to live with a detailed record beginning
with childhood that will stay with us for life wherever we go, searchable and
accessible from anywhere in the world. This data can often be of dubious reliability; it can be false and defamatory; or it can be true but deeply humiliating or discrediting. We may find it increasingly difficult to have a fresh start,
a second chance, or a clean slate. . . . This record will affect our ability to define our identities, to obtain jobs, to participate in public life, and more.60

56

See JOSEPH P. BIGUS, DATA MINING WITH NEURAL NETWORKS 17–18 (1996) (discussing correlation of product purchases); Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-Based
Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the Internet Society,
56 ME. L. REV. 13, 36–37 (2004) (discussing use of data mining to reveal correlations in consumer behavior).
57
See Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation? Data Mining, National Security and the “Adverse Inference” Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757, 768 (2006) (“Factors such as
our credit score are meant to be predictors of how likely we are to repay our loans; likewise, our health,
age and other physical characteristics are meant to be predictors of what our life expectancy may be.”).
58
The U.S. market for pre-employment background screening is roughly $2 billion per year.
J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting Privacy in Commercial
Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 110 (2008). Predicting employee success based on past history is a
common use of the digital dossier. See Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its De-evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 87
(2008) (discussing databases for pre-employment screening).
59
A merchant can electronically submit a shopper’s driver’s license or bank information, which can
be gleaned from the check itself, and various services compare that information to their databases to
provide the merchant with a rating of the check-writer’s reliability. See Ronald J. Mann, Information
Technology and Non-legal Sanctions in Financing Transactions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1627, 1631–32
(2001) (discussing check verification systems).
60
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 17 (2007).
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This has been the dominant concern of the privacy field for the last decade.61
C. Signaling and the Personal Prospectus
Despite being the center of attention in privacy law, however, sorting is
not the only means available to overcome information asymmetries. The
three examples in the Introduction—personal monitoring discounts for car
insurance, the innovation of health monitoring systems, and the incorporation of verified drug testing into one’s enhanced resume—illustrate that we
are now living in a signaling world, in which firms can increasingly rely on
information transmitted directly from a consumer to the firm instead of engaging in data mining to read the tea leaves about the consumer’s characteristics or behavior.
The personal prospectus is a metaphor to represent the idea that signaling is becoming increasingly pervasive, cost-effective, and powerful as an
economic mechanism. This section explores that evolution. Most fundamentally, this section makes an empirical claim: the Internet and digitization are decreasing the transaction costs of signaling by making verifiable
signals more readily available throughout the economy, and one can therefore expect signaling to become more and more important and ubiquitous as
a response to information asymmetries. This is a novel and somewhat radical claim. It sets the groundwork for Part II, which discusses the implications of these developments for informational privacy law.
I do not claim that signaling will eclipse sorting or that the digital dossier and the threat of sorting will become less important than the threats of
signaling. I merely argue that signaling is increasing as signaling costs de61

See, e.g., SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2000) (discussing the threat of linked databases and the digitization of records); Fred H.
Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435,
435–36 (2008) (discussing the end of “practical obscurity” brought about by data mining); Will Thomas
DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 291 (2003) (“[T]hree major digital developments . . . deeply affect privacy: (1) the increase in data creation and the resulting collection of vast amounts of personal data—caused by the recording of almost every modern interaction;
(2) the globalization of the data market and the ability of anyone to collate and examine this data; and
(3) lack of the types of control mechanisms for digital data that existed to protect analog data.”); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 317–20
(2008) (discussing widespread use of data mining by government agencies and the government’s reliance on commercial data gathering companies); Herman T. Tavani, Informational Privacy, Data Mining, and the Internet, 1 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 137 (1999) (discussing the ethical implications of
disclosure and data mining); Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 1 (2003) (discussing privacy concerns related to data mining); Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy 2.0,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 77–86 (discussing various types of personal information now available digitally, including images and video); Seth Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in
Cyberspace, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, at para. 10 (2000), http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue2/v5i2a6Safier.html (discussing how these technologies allow for collection of “vast amounts of in-depth, and
potentially sensitive, personal information”).
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crease and that this trend will change our understanding of informational
privacy.
The key change causing the shift to the signaling economy is that digital information can be verified at very low cost. This change is occurring in
at least two domains: digital monitoring of directly observable data and digital access to directly verifiable data. By “directly observable data” I mean
the aggregated records from the many digital sensors monitoring one’s life:
the “black box” in one’s car, the health monitor on one’s wrist, the smart
grid monitors in one’s home. By “directly verifiable data” I mean verified
information from reliable sources, such as one’s income level, educational
background and achievements, mental and physical health history, deeded
or titled assets, credit history, immigration status, insurance coverage, employment history, professional licenses and status, registered holdings of
public securities or participation in securities filings, registered patents or
trademarks, criminal record, civil legal history, bankruptcy records, birth
certificate information, marriage and divorce records, child support payment history, or tax history. MyBackgroundCheck.com’s resume enhancement through verified drug testing is an example.62 In addition, one
could imagine that over time certain types of social media-driven information could enter the personal prospectus: one’s Klout score, eBay Feedback
score, or reputational ranking on industry-specific rating sites or reputation
aggregators.63
Both types of information comprise one’s personal prospectus. Both
can be powerful signals of one’s type to other economic actors. Both are
playing an increasingly important role in the evolution of a signaling economy.
1. Digital Monitoring of Directly Observable Data.—Monitoring and
sensor technology is increasingly sophisticated and pervasive. The data
collected by such sensors is often both extremely personal and extremely
valuable as part of an individual’s personal prospectus. We are now able to
track, record, and share more and better information about ourselves, and
the technologies that enable signaling are evolving rapidly. Consider three
contexts in which digital monitoring is expanding the scope of the personal
prospectus: health care, equipment tracking, and employee monitoring.64
62

See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
For discussion of Klout scores, see supra note 12. For discussion of reputation aggregators, see
Ric Merrifield, The Rise of the Reputation Score, BLOGGING INNOVATION (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.
business-strategy-innovation.com/wordpress/2010/09/the-rise-of-the-reputation-score.
64
In addition to the monitoring technologies discussed here, I have excluded others for brevity.
Smart grid technologies, for instance, offer many similar monitoring and signaling opportunities. See
Patrick McDaniel & Stephen McLaughlin, Security and Privacy Challenges in the Smart Grid, IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY, May/June 2009, at 75, 77 (“Energy use information stored at the meter and distributed thereafter acts as an information-rich side channel, exposing customer habits and behaviors.”);
Elias Leake Quinn, Privacy and the New Energy Infrastructure 4–5 (Ctr. for Energy & Envtl. Sec.,
Working Paper No. 09-001, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1370731.
63
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Remote health monitoring, or “pervasive health care,” is a hot technology now that ubiquitous Internet access has made constant, real-time sensors possible.65 Such monitoring is touted as a means to improve care and
reduce health care costs.66 Remote monitoring systems can track calorie
use,67 blood glucose levels,68 arrhythmia,69 epilepsy,70 stress,71 and vital signs
such as temperature, heart rate, and respiration.72 Intel is developing a
“magic carpet” for the elderly that tracks their movement in the home to
gather data to prevent falls, a major component of health costs for seniors.73
Newer systems are also being imagined to remotely monitor the condition
of mental health patients and addicts. These systems track sleep patterns,
weight, physical movement, vital signs, and medication compliance to produce alerts for worsening mental illness74 or addiction relapse.75
Individuals will also be increasingly able to use such monitors to signal
their health characteristics for economic gain. The foundations are already
laid for such signaling. Experts are discussing “pervasive lifestyle incentive
management” systems that could electronically transfer micropayments to
reward a user’s exercise or healthy eating.76 Employers have already begun
to incentivize employees to participate in wellness programs or to meet
health goals for blood pressure, cholesterol levels, or weight.77 Some em65

See generally Varshney, supra note 9, at 115 (“Comprehensive health monitoring services would
allow patients to be monitored at any time in any location.” (emphasis omitted)).
66
See, e.g., Upkar Varshney, A Framework for Supporting Emergency Messages in Wireless Patient Monitoring, 45 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 981, 981 (2008) (“[P]atient monitoring using wireless
technologies is being considered as a solution to both improving the quality of healthcare and reducing
the rate of increase for healthcare services.”).
67
See BODYMEDIA, http://www.bodymedia.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
68
See IDEAL LIFE, http://www.ideallifeonline.com/products/glucomanager (last visited Jan. 30,
2012).
69
See Corventis™—NUVANT, CORVENTIS, http://www.corventis.com/US/nuvant.asp (last visited
Jan. 30, 2012).
70
See Mohammad Modarreszadeh & Robert N. Schmidt, Wireless, 32-Channel, EEG and Epilepsy
Monitoring System, 19 INT’L CONF. IEEE ENGINEERING MED. & BIOLOGY SOC. 1157, 1157 (1997).
71
See Emil Jovanov et al., Stress Monitoring Using a Distributed Wireless Intelligent Sensor System, IEEE ENGINEERING MED. & BIOLOGY MAG., May/June 2003, at 49, 49.
72
See TOUMAZ, http://www.toumaz.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (offering wireless technology
that tracks vital signs in real time).
73
See Clark, supra note 6.
74
See Upkar Varshney, A Framework for Wireless Monitoring of Mental Health Conditions,
31 INT’L CONF. IEEE ENGINEERING MED. BIOLOGY SOC. 5219, 5220 (2009).
75
See Doug Cantor, Brilliant 10: Santosh Kumar, the Sensor Guru, POPULAR SCI. (Nov. 16, 2010,
3:08 PM), http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-10/brilliant-10-santosh-kumar-sensor-guru (discussing AutoSense, a system to remotely monitor stress and self-destructive behaviors in addiction therapy).
76
See Varshney, supra note 9, at 115.
77
Safeway, for example, has a “Healthy Measures” program that offers reimbursement for meeting
certain wellness targets. See Harald Schmidt, Kristin Voigt & Daniel Wikler, Carrots, Sticks, and
Health Care Reform—Problems with Wellness Incentives, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. E3(1), E3(2) (2010)
(discussing Safeway’s program).

1168

105:1153 (2011)

Unraveling Privacy

ployers have tracked employees’ smoking habits even when the employees
are away from their place of work.78 Some have fired employees who engage in behavior likely to raise the employer’s health insurance costs.79
Most dramatically, Congress recently endorsed incentive-based health
reform in the health care bill.80 Although group health plans generally cannot discriminate based on health status, the PPACA permits employers to
provide discounts, rebates, and rewards for those who participate in wellness initiatives.81 If the reward applies merely for participation, there is no
limit to its scope. If the reward requires a participant to achieve a certain
health target, the reward must not be greater than thirty percent of the cost
of the health plan’s coverage.82 This is an increase from the twenty-percent
cap that was in place under previous regulations.83 In addition, under the
PPACA, the Secretary for Labor, Health, and Human Services has discretion to increase this cap to fifty percent.84
Given this foundation, it is easy to imagine why individuals or employees would use remote health monitoring systems to secure discounts.
A health-conscious employee who carefully controls her diet and exercises
regularly may see such discounts as a justified reward for healthy behavior.
Monitoring is changing other markets as well. For example, car rental
agencies have begun to implement tracking technologies to monitor driving
habits and car use. This has generated some controversy. Recently courts
in Connecticut85 and California86 have expressed concerns about the use of
speed monitoring devices and GPS tracking in rental cars. These cases
have focused on the consumer protection aspects of the contracts at issue,
78

See Jeremy W. Peters, Company’s Smoking Ban Means Off-Hours, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2005, at C5.
79
Jill Schachner Chanen, The Boss Is Watching, 94 A.B.A. J. 48, 50–51 (2008).
80
The PPACA codifies the incentive regulations previously established under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
81
For an overview of these changes, see U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CRITICAL EMPLOYER
ISSUES IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 29 (2010).
82
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2006); see also U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 81, at
29.
83
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 81, at 29.
84
Id.
85
In American Car Rental, Inc. v. Commissioner of Consumer Protection, Connecticut filed an administrative complaint against a car rental agency that charged a $150 fee each time a customer’s rental
vehicle exceeded seventy-nine miles per hour for more than two consecutive minutes. 869 A.2d 1198,
1201 (Conn. 2005). The rental agreement warned customers that the agency’s cars were “GPS
equipped” and that the $150 fee would apply, but it did not explain GPS technology or provide details
about the workings of the fee. Id. at 1201–02. The court found that the practice violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act as an unfair penalty clause rather than a legitimate liquidated damages
provision. Id. at 1201.
86
In People v. Acceleron Corp., California alleged that the rental car company failed to inform consumers about the use of GPS tracking technology and the fee the company imposed if a consumer drove
a car outside of California. See Complaint at 3, People v. Acceleron Corp., No. 04-129 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms04/04-129_complaint.pdf.
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generally finding a failure to sufficiently notify consumers about the devices or fees. They have generally held that rental car companies “may use
tracking technology . . . so long as companies clearly and conspicuously notify customers of such use.”87 In addition, at least three states88 have
enacted statutes restricting the use of such monitors.89 California and New
York, for example, strictly constrain the use of GPS or other tracking technology to gather information about a consumer’s use of a rental car except
to locate a stolen or missing vehicle.90
Note that, in each of these examples, the rental car agency imposed a
punitive fee on the consumer for misuse of the vehicle. It is quite possible
that had these “fees” for bad behavior instead been framed as “discounts”
for good behavior, no consumer litigation would have resulted. No state
has directly addressed the consumer’s potential interest in sharing GPSenabled information about her use of a rental vehicle to receive a discount.
The car insurance examples91 suggest that discount-based programs will
fare better than fee-based penalties.
Location-enabled smart phone applications and services are increasingly turning to such discounts to incentivize location-revelation. For example, DailyCandy’s Android phone application uses GPS location
information to offer discounts on clothing and other merchandise to shoppers as they walk by participating shops.92 Shopkick provides department
stores, coffee shops, and shopping malls with devices that emit an inaudible
sound detectable only by an iPhone or Android phone with the Shopkick
application; shoppers browsing in a Best Buy, American Eagle Outfitters,
Target, Macy’s, or Sports Authority can then earn “kickbucks” simply for
entering the store.93 Kickbucks are redeemable for prizes—including downloadable songs and donations to charity—as well as in-store discounts that

87

See Leah Altaras, Follow that Car! Legal Issues Arising from Installation of Tracking Devices in
Leased Consumer Goods and Equipment, 3 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 8, at para. 16 (2007).
88
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1936(o) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-609 (West 2010);
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-z(13-a) (McKinney 2011).
89
States have similarly regulated the use of GPS or other tracking technologies in privately owned
vehicles. Such statutes generally require manufacturers to disclose the presence of such technology to a
car buyer. In addition, various states have required the consumer’s consent to access data created by
such devices. No states, however, have banned such devices or banned consumers from disclosing such
information as they see fit. See Altaras, supra note 87, at 22–30 (discussing state legislation).
90
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1936(o); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-z(13-a).
91
See supra notes 1–4.
92
See Stylish NYC Alerts on Your Android Phone, DAILY CANDY (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.
dailycandy.com/all-cities/article/85902/Stylish-NYC-Alerts-on-Your-Android-Phone.
93
See SHOPKICK, http://www.shopkick.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012); Tom Simonite, Bringing
Cell-Phone Location-Sensing Indoors, TECH. REV. (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.technologyreview.com/
communications/26156/. Other companies are also working to pinpoint a consumer’s location inside a
given store or mall. See, e.g., POINT INSIDE, http://www.pointinside.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).

1170

105:1153 (2011)

Unraveling Privacy

ring up at the cash register automatically.94 Finally, the discounts offered by
“check-in” location services such as FourSquare95 and Facebook96 further
suggest that incentives may persuade users to disclose such data.97
Next consider employee monitoring. Employers have always sought
more and better information about employees’ whereabouts, effort, and
output. Digital monitoring increasingly allows employees to signal the
quality of their work and trustworthiness to their employers by revealing
private personal information.
In some cases, employees have been asked to consent to tracking in return for some offered benefit. In Department of Education v. Halpin, for
example, an employee was terminated after GPS technology in an employer-issued cell phone revealed that he had misrepresented his whereabouts on
his time records.98 The administrative court noted that the employee had
not been required to use the cell phone; other employees refused the offered
phones. The employee in question accepted the benefit of the phone and
with it the employer’s tracking technology.99
Such employee tracking will likely increase if radio frequency identification (RFID) becomes more ubiquitous. Although RFID adoption has
been slower than many originally predicted, RFID tags have been used to
track employees as they move around various settings.100 The Dubai International Airport uses RFID tags to track over 9000 workers, the security
firm CityWatcher is experimenting with subcutaneous RFID tags implanted
into the forearms of some employees as a security measure, and the Oak
Ridge National Laboratories in Tennessee uses RFID to monitor whether
employees have properly evacuated in emergency situations.101

94

See The App, SHOPKICK, http://www.shopkick.com/app.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2012); see also
Simonite, supra note 93 (describing the technology behind Shopkick).
95
See FOURSQUARE, http://www.foursquare.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
96
See Share Where You Are, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/location (last visited Oct.
21, 2011) (formerly known as Facebook Places).
97
See Andrew Weinreich, Check-ins vs. Persistent Location: How Big a Deal Is Facebook Places?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2010, 3:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-weinreich/
checkins-vs-persistent-lo_1_b_699653.html (arguing that widespread location disclosure “will only
happen when the user believes the value derived from the service outweighs any perceived privacy risks
from sharing his location” and that “[f]or persistent location to work . . . I have to be motivated by cheap
lattes”).
98
OATH Index No. 818/07, 2 (N.Y.C. Office of Admin. Trials & Hearings Aug. 9, 2007).
99
For additional discussion, see NoviTech Now Using Active RFID System for Employee Monitoring, RFIDNEWS (Aug. 28, 2007), http://www.rfidnews.org/2007/08/28/novitech-now-using-active-rfidsystem-for-employee-monitoring.
100
See id.; Real Time Employee Tracking Helps Home Caregivers, CONTACTLESSNEWS (Feb. 4,
2008), http://www.contactlessnews.com/2008/02/04/real-time-employee-tracking-helps-homecaregivers.
101
These examples are drawn from Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Getting Under Your Skin—Literally:
RFID in the Employment Context, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 237, 242–43.
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The privacy aspects of RFID have received some attention in the legal
literature,102 and several states have prohibited employers from requiring
employees to implant subcutaneous RFID tags.103 No state, however, has
forbidden employees from consenting to such tracking. Employees willing
to accept tracking technologies such as GPS or RFID to signal their loyalty,
diligence, or cooperation are therefore able to do so to distinguish themselves from their peers.104
Regardless of its context—health, equipment rental, or employment—
this directly observable data divides into three basic types. First, some of
these technologies allow an uninformed economic counterparty direct
access to the information it wants. Thus, for example, a health insurer or
employer might want to know whether an individual is exercising. If the
individual’s heart rate or miles walked per day can be monitored directly,
the uninformed counterparty becomes directly informed.105 The previously
uninformed counterparty does not need to sort based on proxies for exercise
such as education level or geographical location, nor does the individual
signal her type exactly. She is merely providing direct data about her type
to the previously uninformed party.
Second, in many instances the exact trait in question cannot be directly
monitored even with advanced digital sensors. An employer might care
most about an employee’s diligence or persistence, but no digital sensor can
directly reveal such characteristics. An employee might consent to an
RFID badge or other monitors of his whereabouts, however, to reveal the
amount of time spent at his desk, as opposed to the water cooler, hoping
that this proxy for persistence or diligence would impress his employer.
Many of the economic uses for these digital sensors are of this type: they
provide new proxies for traits that are otherwise difficult to monitor.
Third, an individual’s willingness to be monitored may in itself be a
signal of certain desirable qualities. The Tiwi system, for example, is a
monitoring device meant to improve teenage driving. It allows parents to
see the location of their teenager’s car, receive instant alerts if their teenager
is speeding, and know whether their teenager’s seat belt is buckled.106 The
102

See, e.g., Kyle Sommer, Riding the Wave: The Uncertain Future of RFID Legislation, 35 J.
LEGIS. 48 (2009); Jonathan Weinberg, Tracking RFID, 3 I/S J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 777 (2008);
Reuven R. Levary et al., Radio Frequency Identification: Legal Aspects, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2005,
at 1, 3–6, http://jolt.richmond.edu/v12i2/article6.pdf; Serena G. Stein, Where Will Consumers Find Privacy Protection from RFIDs?: A Case for Federal Legislation, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. (Mar. 8, 2007),
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2007DLTR0003.html.
103
No federal statutes expressly relate to RFID. Some states have regulated RFID’s use or forbidden requiring employees to implant subcutaneous RFID chips. See Pagnattaro, supra note 101, at 247–
49 (reviewing state statutes).
104
See id. at 248 (raising the question of “voluntary” adoption of RFID or GPS disclosure in passing but without discussion).
105
This technology exists. See FITBIT, supra note 8.
106
See The Features, TIWI, http://www.tiwi.com/for_families/the_features (last visited Jan. 30,
2012).
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AnPac Insurance Company’s DriveSmart program currently offers discounts for teens using Tiwi.107 DriveSmart differs, however, from the car
insurance monitoring programs already discussed. Unlike programs in
which the insurance carrier receives the monitored data, and such information directly affects the insured’s premiums, DriveSmart does not receive
the collected information. Instead, AnPac offers a discount merely because
the teenager’s parents are receiving the data, which signals to AnPac that
the teenager and her parents are responsible and care about driving safety.108
Regardless of whether sensor technology provides direct observation
of an economically desired trait, the ability to signal a desired trait, or the
ability to indirectly signal one’s type merely by using the technology, such
monitoring is already vastly increasing the amount and quality of information a person can share about herself. It is a key component of the personal
prospectus: a huge pool of verified, high-quality information that an individual can make available to others for economic purposes.
2. Digital Access to Directly Verifiable Data.—Direct digital monitoring is one source of information for the personal prospectus, but it is not,
and will not be, the only source. Instead, a second type of information may
come to be at least as important: information individuals choose to share by
granting digital access to directly verifiable personal data.
Currently each of us has access to many different databases containing
our personal information.109 I may have a bank account at Chase Bank, an
investment account at Charles Schwab, an individual retirement account at
Fidelity, and an online repository for my medical records on Google Health.
In addition, many important facts about us are kept in digital databases to
which we do not have immediate access, but could. For example, the university from which I graduated holds my educational records and achievements; my employer holds my employment history, salary, and evaluations;
the government holds my tax records; and the court system holds documentation of my criminal and legal history.
As information technologies advance, it will be easier and easier to
share such information about oneself by granting others temporary permission to query one’s personal records. In other words, consumers will be
able to digitally link an interested counterparty to these sources that hold
107

See Parents Help Keep Teen Drivers Safe with DriveSmart, supra note 4.
See id.
109
Although the Internet era has vastly increased the aggregated information available to data miners, this sea of information has filled in around the islands of more secure, more personal information
that continue to remain largely under individual control (e.g., bank account or investment information).
I call these islands the “private remainder.” There are generally five categories of such information: financial information (including tax records), medical information, educational information, employment
information (including the regulation of background checks), and library and video rental information.
For an excellent overview of the various privacy statutes and regulations, see Daniel J. Solove & Chris
Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 359–62, 364–68,
which summarizes the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Privacy Act, and the limits of U.S. privacy law.
108
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verified evidence about themselves. If applying for a loan, one will not
merely disclose “I make $100,000 per year” but will instead point the potential lender to the source of the information on which those words are
based—in this case, to the employer who pays the $100,000 salary. The
borrower will digitally link a potential lender to the borrower’s employer
and give the lender instant access to the employer’s verified salary information.110 Your employer’s computer will simply issue a verification of the
requested information: “Yes, she does indeed make $100,000.”
In addition to a resume, individuals will grant access to their personal
prospectus and the underlying verified data to which a resume typically attests. Employment history will be verified as employers, or the Internal
Revenue Service, share data in response to authorized queries about an individual’s work record. Criminal history will be verified as court clerks
share data in response to authorized queries about an individual’s past.
Medical records will be verified as physicians, hospitals, and insurance
companies share data in response to authorized queries about an individual’s medical history. Immigration status, professional licenses, military
records, tax compliance history, and other data will be verified through
government data sources.
Connected to the raw, verified data in this way, the personal prospectus
becomes an even more powerful signaling tool than if it only contained the
digital record from direct monitoring devices. As the economy’s information architecture makes digital records increasingly portable, comparable,
and verifiable, an individual will be able to present himself to others
through the personal prospectus—to show his type, characteristics, and history by revealing verified information about himself.
The personal prospectus would thus differ from the digital dossier in
two primary ways.111 First, the prospectus would be comprised of verified
information whereas the digital dossier is largely comprised of unverified
110

Since the invention of hypertext, there has been discussion of the extent to which web information should be linked back to its source. Ted Nelson, the man who coined the term “hypertext,” originally envisioned that all text on the web would be linked to its originating source, so that use of the text
could be controlled by its original author and micropayments could be made for “downstream” use of
the text. Discussion continues about the extent to which web text, images, and other information can
and should be linked to its source. See generally Zittrain, supra note 61, at 107–08 (discussing Nelson’s
original vision and the current debate on the issue). The personal prospectus is a related idea. Rather
than focus on authorial content shared over the web such as a book or photograph, I focus on data about
a person that originally reside in an institution’s database but are then released onto the web and wind up
in the digital dossier.
111
There is a third way that it differs from the digital dossier: constraining moral hazard. In the Introduction, Tom Goodwin notes that having a monitor in his car makes him drive more carefully. This
is an advantage of the personal prospectus—or disclosure—over the digital dossier. When an insurance
company sorts insureds without their knowledge using the digital dossier, the insurance company reaps
no benefit in terms of constraining moral hazard. When an insured agrees to disclose their information
through the personal prospectus, by contrast, they are aware of that disclosure and are more likely to regulate their behavior in the future.
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information. The prospectus would be made up of information that was tied
back, digitally, to its source. For example, the prospectus would not just
contain a copy of a medical record—it would contain the copy and a digital
signature certifying the record as legitimate and linking that record back to
the physician or hospital that originally issued it. The prospectus would
contain not only an educational transcript but also a digital connection to
the university or graduate school from which the student graduated. It
would, in short, be a verified database of information about the individual—
not just the individual’s representation of herself but the individual’s collection of others’ certified records about her. This increases the signaling value of the data tremendously.
Second, even the public information in the personal prospectus would
be different in kind from the information in the digital dossier. Whereas the
digital dossier might contain information about one’s criminal record or
professional licenses, that information is unverified—when one runs a
background check on someone using the public information available on
the Internet, there is no guarantee that the right information has been pulled
on the right individual nor that the information is accurate. If an individual
electronically compiled a personal prospectus over the course of her lifetime, however, such information would be included in a verified form. This
would make such public information in the personal prospectus more valuable than the “same” piece of information in the digital dossier.
To illustrate, contrast what might be in a hypothetical “John Smith’s”
digital dossier with what might be in his personal prospectus. Today, one
could run a credit search, criminal background check, or Google search on
John Smith and find the scattered pieces of his digital dossier. One might
turn up the addresses John has resided at in the last few years or the companies he has worked for. One might discover that his credit rating is not the
best or that he has a history of traffic violations. All of these pieces of information could be aggregated from John’s digital dossier to form a picture
of John and to sort John from other potential economic counterparts.
In the future, however, John might have a digital personal prospectus
available with verified information about himself. He could make that
prospectus available to signal his qualities and characteristics. One could
query that data set to find his court or criminal record directly. His traffic
violations would appear but so would the community service he did to clear
his record. The name of his employers would appear but so would the personnel records that John chose to disclose: his record of promotions, salary
levels, or relevant parts of his performance reports. John’s residences
would appear but so would the record of his rent payments from each landlord or even the landlord’s assessments of John as a tenant. And importantly, the person searching for this information would be confident (or at
least more confident) that the search results were actually about the right
John Smith. Rather than search the digital dossier and receive results of
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questionable value, an employer or landlord could simply get the information from John directly.
This is the power of the personal prospectus: to proactively assert
one’s identity into the economy rather than having to react to the sea of information in the digital dossier, into which one has little visibility and over
which one has little control.112 If John were a good credit risk, he could assert that fact by granting potential lenders temporary access to records of
other loans outstanding and his payment histories on those loans. He could
reveal his credit card transactions for the last three years, showing his
record of paying his balance on time and spending responsibly. He could
signal his strength as a borrower by showing his reliability as an employee,
revealing to a lender his employment history. John’s personal prospectus
could offer him the chance to proactively signal his qualities.
II. SIGNALING’S UNRAVELING THREAT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
The personal prospectus promises the ability to proactively assert oneself in the economy. That promise, however, contains within it a radical
threat: the possible unraveling of privacy altogether because some individuals initially will find it in their interest to disclose information for personal
gain and then, as the unraveling proceeds, everyone will realize that disclosure is no longer a choice because the signaling economy attaches stigma to
staying silent.
This Part explores this unraveling effect, a phenomenon discussed by
law and economics scholars since the early 1980s in other contexts but not
taken up generally by privacy scholars. It argues that the arrival of the personal prospectus and a signaling economy should bring the unraveling
problem to the fore of informational privacy discussion.
A. Unraveling in a Signaling Economy
As low-cost signaling evolves and becomes more ubiquitous, the first
and most fundamental point is that some people will want to disclose and
others will not. Everyone may eventually discover, however, that they have
little choice. At first, those with positive private information (the “top” of
the pool) will disclose to seek discounts and economic benefit and to defend
against the negative effects of the digital dossier. Eventually, even those
with the worst private information (the “bottom” of the pool) may realize
that they have little choice but to disclose to avoid the stigma of keeping information secret. A given individual might benefit by signaling in one context (e.g., good drivers will seek cheaper car insurance), but few people if
112

A few firms are experimenting with business models that seem very much like the idea of the
personal prospectus. See ALLOW, http://www.i-allow.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012); PERSONAL, http://
www.personal.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). For further analysis of these recent startups, see Scott R.
Peppet, Privacy Intermediaries (work in progress) (on file with author).
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any will gain in every context. As signaling becomes more pervasive, however, disclosure may become the norm across the economy. Keeping one’s
personal prospectus private may become suspect. This is the unraveling
threat to privacy.
1. Self-interested Self-disclosure and Defending Against the Digital
Dossier.—Simple self-interest will drive self-disclosure by those with favorable private information. Assuming one has positive characteristics to
share, revealing them can provide economic benefits.113 This is what the car
insurance, health monitoring, and employment tracking examples illustrate:
in markets with information asymmetry, individuals will seek preferential
treatment or discounts in return for disclosing information useful to other
economic actors.
Although most privacy literature has focused on how individuals can
and should keep their information to ourselves, it ignores the reality that in
many cases it is extremely valuable to share information about oneself with
others.114 The privacy field has been so concerned with the downsides of
sorting that it has sometimes overlooked that many people will, at least initially, reap benefits from increased signaling.115 For a healthy, nonsmoking, regular exerciser, a means to credibly signal that information to
one’s medical insurer will mean lower premiums. For a dependable, income-earning employee, a means to credibly signal that information to
one’s bank will mean lower rates. For a customer with a large bank account
and a string of other assets, a means to credibly signal that information to a
luxury store will mean better service.116
Signaling through the personal prospectus will also counter the negative effects of the digital dossier. As discussed, one of the threats of the
dossier is inaccurate representation in the economy. Even if someone is a
“good” borrower or a low-risk insured, the digital dossier may still incorrectly sort her into the wrong category. Signaling via the personal prospectus can correct the inaccuracies of the dossier. To see how, consider some
113

I do not mean to reduce privacy’s value to purely economic terms. For those with favorable personal information, self-disclosure may also be dignity-enhancing as an expressive or self-affirming act.
See generally Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1805, 1832–33 (2010) (discussing dignity-enhancing aspects of privacy).
114
See Stan Karas, Loving Big Brother, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 607, 626 (2005) (arguing that
there are certain circumstances in which a person benefits by disclosing information to others).
115
I should acknowledge the work of privacy scholars who have highlighted the value of privacy
losses. See, e.g., DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998); FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE (2001); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1667, 1676 (2008).
116
See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1049–50 (1999) (discussing the ways in which self-disclosure can
reduce search costs).
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of the core concerns that privacy scholars have raised about the spread and
use of the digital dossier. In each instance, signaling through disclosure of
the personal prospectus offers a potential counter to the problems of the
digital dossier.
The first concern about the digital dossier is that it oversimplifies the
individual.117 The digital dossier reduces the inherent complexity of an individual’s identity. Instead of being individualized and context-sensitive,
computerized sorting is lumpy: it classifies people together based on measurable characteristics that do not necessarily accurately represent any given
individual.118 We are not just sorted; an abstraction of us is sorted, assessed, categorized, and acted upon.119
The prospectus offers the individual the ability to represent herself instead of being passively represented by the dossier. By sharing information
proactively instead of reacting to the sorting mechanisms, the individual regains influence over her life. At least initially, she can choose whether and
what to share. This offers the possibility of a richer, more complete selfportrayal.
The second fear of the dossier is its inherent risk of inaccuracy. There
are many potential sources for inaccuracies in the digital dossier. At the
most mundane, online digital information may contain errors because of incorrect entry, aggregation,120 or data retrieval.121 Twenty-five percent of
credit reports contain serious errors, and roughly fifty percent contain inaccurate or outdated information.122 They may contain information about
117

See SOLOVE, supra note 17, at 46.
See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 115
(2000) (“Privacy . . . protects us from being objectified and simplified and judged out of context in a
world of short attention spans, a world in which part of our identity can be mistaken for the whole of our
identity.”); see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE (2004) (discussing privacy and security technology in a post-9/11 era).
119
See Elia Zureik, Theorizing Surveillance: The Case of the Workplace, in SURVEILLANCE AS
SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 31, 39 (David Lyon ed., 2003) (“As a
matter of fact, the subject that is exposed to the ‘observing gaze’ dissolves and is reconstituted in the
abstract through categorization and social ordering . . . .”). But see Karas, supra note 114, at 627–28
(“[F]or some, submission to surveillance may enable a sharper, more stable sense of self.”).
This concern is not new. For a discussion of historical concern about the “invention of disembodied
financial identity” in the nineteenth century, see Lauer, supra note 44, at 302.
120
Ramasastry, supra note 57, at 757–60 (arguing that a “giant game of telephone is going on with
our personal data” and discussing how different the final information in a dossier can be from how it began).
121
See Kim Zetter, Bad Data Fouls Background Checks, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2005), http://www.
wired.com/politics/security/news/2005/03/66856 (discussing problems of error-filled databases).
122
Slobogin, supra note 61, at 324 (stating that one in four credit reports contain serious enough errors to deny credit, employment, or housing, and that fifty-four percent contain outdated or otherwise
inaccurate information or information about other people); see Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos:
Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061, 1076 (2007)
(stating that nearly eighty percent of credit reports contain errors); Zetter, supra note 121 (stating that
seventy-nine percent of credit reports contain errors).
118
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another person altogether, particularly when one has a common name like
John Smith.123 In short, the digital dossier is noisy.
The personal prospectus offers obvious advantages over the dossier on
this score. If an individual can aggregate verified information about herself
to share with others, the individual knows that the information is accurate
and that it is indeed her information.124 This, again, empowers the individual to assert herself in the world by portraying herself accurately.
The third objection to the dossier is that one has no recourse against
it.125 There is no phone number to call to inspect one’s digital dossier and
no website to check. Instead, one is being represented by a vague cloud of
information that one cannot control. The prospectus, in contrast, can be reviewed. Although an individual could not necessarily change the information in her prospectus, she would at least know what information it
contained.126
Finally, the fourth and most fundamental concern is discrimination.
As we have seen, sorting is the essential function of the digital dossier, and
thus the dossier threatens to spawn new forms of unwanted discrimination.
Consider a local bank trying to determine how to serve two customers,
Alice and Bob.127 Through its data mining efforts, the bank determines that
Alice is a likely high-value customer whereas Bob is not. And Alice is likely to be susceptible to offers from other banks that would pull her away
whereas Bob is not. The local bank decides to offer Alice an attractive interest-bearing checking account and a reduced loan rate to induce her to
stay loyal. Bob, on the other hand, receives no such benefits and may even
be burdened with higher fees and other measures meant to induce him to

123

See De Armond, supra note 122, at 1075 (“A certain amount of information attributed to any
one individual may be false.”).
124
Although the personal prospectus offers the individual the ability to represent herself accurately
to others, it also introduces the possibility of misrepresentation. I assume here that the personal prospectus is verified by tying its contents digitally to their sources. There is some possibility, of course, of individuals attempting to hack this process to falsify their personal records.
125
See Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging of Personally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 576–84 (2008) (discussing benefits and
risks of the spread of digital dossiers, including the lack of real verification or recourse); see also
SOLOVE, supra note 17, at 96 (“[T]he growing use and dissemination of personal information creates a
Kafkaesque world of bureaucracy, where we are increasingly powerless and vulnerable, where personal
information is not only outside our control but also is subjected to a bureaucratic process that is itself not
adequately controlled.”).
126
Because the information within a personal prospectus would be verified information linked back
to its source for easy verification, an individual could not simply enter the prospectus and edit the information.
127
This example is drawn from Anthony Danna & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., All That Glitters Is Not
Gold: Digging Beneath the Surface of Data Mining, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 375 (2002).
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take his business elsewhere. Some have labeled this “weblining” to evoke
the pejorative connotations of “redlining.”128
The personal prospectus would not so much counter economic discrimination as make it more accurate—more fair, so to speak, if not more just.
The increased accuracy of the information in the personal prospectus would
allow an individual consumer to ensure that she was sorted properly—if she
had to be sorted. In other words, by signaling, individuals could ensure that
they were treated according to their actual characteristics, not according to
the potentially inaccurate caricature found in the digital dossier.129
This may be small consolation, but it is likely to be the reality of a signaling economy. In an economy with robust signaling, those with strong
reputations, valuable credentials, clean medical records, impressive credit
scores, and big pocketbooks will want to signal those characteristics in
hopes of receiving preferential treatment by other economic actors.
2. Stigma and Unraveling.—Now we come to the heart of the matter.
In addition to these self-interested reasons for availing oneself of the personal prospectus, a different motivation for self-disclosure may creep into
the economy as well. As the personal prospectus becomes more accepted, it
will give rise to its own stigma: when disclosure becomes low-cost and routine, those who hold out are suspect. This is the privacy threat of the personal prospectus. Failure to make one’s personal prospectus available to
the bank, the credit card company, the insurance agent, or the potential employer may carry with it the presumption that one is hiding information.
You can be sorted because you do not signal.
This is the core insight of the unraveling effect in economics. Early
work by Paul Milgrom130 and Sanford Grossman131 independently explored
the unraveling process that occurs as those who can certify their quality do
so to distinguish themselves from the larger pool of lower-grade labor,
128

See David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies, in
SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 119, at
13, 14 (“In processes known variously as ‘digital redlining’ or ‘weblining’, customers are classified according to their relative worth.” (citations omitted)); Janet Dean Gertz, Comment, The Purloined Personality: Consumer Profiling in Financial Services, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 943, 961 (2002) (“[P]rofiling
may simply be a new and insidious legal form of discrimination that merely automates old-fashioned
redlining practices.”).
129
See Strahilevitz, supra note 115, at 1676 (“Often, the choice is not between sorting and not sorting; the economic and social gains from sorting are simply too great, while banning sorting in many contexts will be simultaneously costly and not terribly effective. Rather, the real choice is between sorting
on the basis of uncomfortable criteria and sorting on the basis of obnoxious and distasteful criteria.”).
130
See Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,
12 BELL J. ECON. 380, 388 (1981) (discussing the salesman’s incentive to fully disclose product quality
because of similar unraveling effect).
131
See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About
Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981); Grossman & Hart, supra note 14, at 323 (“[I]f there is no
transactions cost then it will always be in the seller’s interest to disclose the quality of [an] item voluntarily.”).
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products, or services.132 Others have followed in these footsteps, exploring
the unraveling of information under various conditions (competitive versus
monopolistic markets, etc.) and in various contexts (disclosure of product
quality, securities-related information, pretrial settlement, etc.).133
The unraveling effect holds that under conditions of information
asymmetry but with verifiable information and penalties for fraud,134 every
member of a pool will ultimately reveal its type even if at first it seems unwise for each to do so. At first the individual with the “best” trait has reason to disclose her type because her trait is better than the average; being
lumped together with the rest of the pool is not in her self-interest. Once
the best individual has disclosed her type, however, the “average” type remaining in the pool shifts. Now the second-best individual has a similar interest in disclosure. The average quality drops again. As Robert Frank puts
it, “The unraveling process is set in motion, and in the end all [individuals]
must either [disclose] or live with the knowledge” that others will assume
they are of the “worst” type.135 “The general message of the full-disclosure
principle is that lack of evidence that something resides in a favored category will often suggest that it belongs to a less favored one.”136
In a signaling economy, consumers may increasingly pay a price for
keeping personal information private. Paying the price of not signaling differs from price discrimination or weblining because in the latter instances a
firm is sorting a consumer based on the consumer’s known (or supposed)
characteristics derived from information about that consumer in the digital
dossier. But here the firm need not even inspect the consumer’s digital dossier: the firm will assume that it has learned something about the consumer
merely by being denied access to the consumer’s personal prospectus.
132

Although Grossman and Milgrom are generally credited with the effect, Kip Viscusi first used
the term “unraveling.” See W. Kip Viscusi, A Note on “Lemons” Markets with Quality Certification,
9 BELL J. ECON. 277, 278 (1978) (“[E]nterprises or individuals at the above-average end of the quality
spectrum successively distinguish themselves from the group in a process that unravels from the top
down.”); see also W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE 86 (1983) (discussing unraveling).
133
See, e.g., Ronald A. Dye & Sri S. Sridhar, Industry-Wide Disclosure Dynamics, 33 J. ACCT. RES.
157, 157 (1995) (looking at unraveling across an industry as “[v]oluntary disclosures by some
firms . . . provoke other firms to make related disclosures”); Joseph Farrell, Voluntary Disclosure: Robustness of the Unraveling Result, and Comments on Its Importance, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION
91 (Ronald E. Grieson, ed., 1986); Andrew E. Stivers, Unraveling of Information: Competition and Uncertainty, 4 TOPICS THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2004) (finding that increased competition in market increases unraveling effect). For early work on pretrial settlement, see Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information
Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 183 (1989).
134
There do not necessarily need to be formal or legal sanctions for misrepresentation. See Trevon
Logan & Manisha Shah, Face Value: Information and Signaling in an Illegal Market (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14841, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1376153 (demonstrating that male sex workers disclose face pictures readily and accurately, and that unraveling is
sufficiently supported by informal enforcement mechanisms to overcome adverse selection).
135
FRANK, supra note 16, at 106.
136
Id. at 106–08.
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Return again to some of the examples considered thus far. If one can
cost-effectively monitor an employee’s exercise habits with a digital armband, what would prevent an employer from drawing negative inferences
about employees who refuse such devices? If one can easily verify whether
a diabetic, heart patient, or psychiatric patient is regulating her blood sugar,
heart rate, or medications properly, why would an insurer not draw negative
inferences from patients refusing to participate in a discount program aimed
at incentivizing such responsible behaviors? To put a point on it, how suspect would you look if your significant other or spouse asked you to join
him or her in signing up for mutual location-tracking via smart phone, and
you refused?137 Once sharing such information becomes cost-effective, not
sharing such information may begin to require justification.
B. Informational Privacy Law’s Unpreparedness for Unraveling
I do not pretend to be the first to consider the threat of unraveling in
the privacy context. I believe Judge Richard Posner should claim that title,
and a few others have since taken up his connection between unraveling and
privacy.138 As Posner put it,
Because people who are above average in any valued attribute have an incentive to signal their possession of that attribute, the existence of discrediting information about persons is likely to become known even if the law does
protect such information, unless disclosure is costly for reasons unrelated to
the private benefits of concealment or the signal is easily faked.139

To date, however, privacy scholars, including Posner, have not treated the
unraveling of privacy as a practical problem so much as a theoretical novelty. Happily for privacy advocates, there has been a “reason[] unrelated to
the private benefits of concealment” that has prevented unraveling to date:
the lack of technological means to build a robust signaling economy. It has
137

Such applications already exist. Most request permission before disclosing your location to
another smart phone user. See, e.g., GPS Tracking App–iLOCi2 for iPhone, LOCIMOBILE, http://www.
locimobile.com/iloci2 (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). Some can be installed surreptitiously on a smart
phone to track that phone without the user’s knowledge. See, e.g., MOBILE SPY, http://www.
mobilespytool.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
138
Jessica Litman’s early article on privacy as a property right saw the unraveling problem, for example. See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000).
She notes that control is at best a stepping stone towards alienability. See id. at 1300. Most interesting,
Litman hints at unraveling: “If easy assignment is the rule, they may no longer have the power to preserve their secrecy; even if they could, the exceptional nature of their asserting a privacy claim will tip
off those from whom this is a secret that there is an interesting secret there.” Id. at 1301; see also Randal C. Picker, Online Advertising, Identity and Privacy (Univ. of Chi., John M. Olin Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 475, 2009), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/475.rcp_.online.pdf
(discussing unraveling in the context of smoking and revelation of behavioral preferences, and talking
about the “privacy externalities” created when one person reveals information that begins an unraveling
that forces others to reveal).
139
POSNER, supra note †, at 107.
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been cheaper to mine for data than to rely on signals. But that is changing.
The costs of signaling are dropping, just as the costs of data mining and
sorting have dropped. Although the Internet-based monitoring and information-sharing technologies so central to the personal prospectus did not
exist when Posner first discussed unraveling, they now make the personal
prospectus a real possibility and a real threat to personal privacy.
Unraveling suggests two sweeping critiques of the dominant approaches to informational privacy. First, when it comes to prescriptions—what to
do next—informational privacy scholarship has almost exclusively proposed solutions that seek to increase individual control over information.
Control, however, provides little protection from unraveling. Second, and
more fundamentally, the field has defined what constitutes a privacy harm
too narrowly. It has assumed that voluntary disclosure causes no privacy
problem, an assumption that the threat of unraveling complicates dramatically. Let us consider each problem in turn.
1. The Inadequacy of Control.—Space and attention span do not
permit an exhaustive overview of the voluminous literature produced by informational privacy scholars over the last two decades. Nor do I want to be
overly reductionist in describing the privacy field, which is rich and varied.
For example, recent work has exploded the definitions of what constitutes
“privacy,”140 as well as begun to reimagine what constitutes privacy harm.141
Both exercises are laudable and useful.
But even a cursory review of the privacy literature should suffice to
demonstrate that control dominates as the primary solution of privacy advocates.142 For example, much informational privacy literature has focused on
property-based prescriptions. The basic idea is this: “[P]rivacy can be cast
as a property right. People should own information about themselves and,
as owners of property, should be entitled to control what is done with it.”143
As Arthur Miller put it in his early privacy work, “If this premise is accepted, the natural corollary is that a [person] has the right to control information about himself and is eligible for the full range of legal protection
140

See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 101–70 (2008) [hereinafter SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY] (providing taxonomy of sixteen aspects of privacy threats); Richards, supra
note 17; Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
141
Privacy scholars have recently taken interest in broadening the definition of harm caused by privacy invasions. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011);
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of
the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 295–96 (2007) (“[T]he law should adapt to account for
injuries to our changed conception of personhood in the twenty-first century.”); Paul Ohm, Broken
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701
(2010); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1887, 1922 (2010) (arguing that “tort law must come to a more sophisticated conception of harm”).
142
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 21, at 820 (“The leading paradigm . . . conceives of privacy as a
personal right to control the use of one’s data.”).
143
Litman, supra note 138, at 1287.
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that attaches to property ownership.”144 Paul Schwartz145 and many others146
have written in or about this vein.147 This literature is full of calls to increase the control individuals have over their personal data.
Tort-based solutions similarly focus on control. Generally these scholars have bemoaned the inadequacy of existing tort remedies148 and proposed additions or improvements to tort law to increase individual
control.149 Sarah Ludington has focused on the potential harm of data trading and dissemination of personal information and has proposed common
law tort remedies to increase an individual’s control over the use of their information.150 Danielle Citron has focused on the harm to an individual’s
sense of control caused by even inadvertent information leaks from massive
corporate-controlled databases and has proposed a strict liability regime to
deter such leaks.151 Neil Richards and Daniel Solove have argued for reconsidering the law of confidentiality as a means to give individuals greater
144

ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS
211 (1971).
145
Schwartz has taken the nuanced view that using property to protect information privacy requires
reconceptualizing what property rights in information must mean. In other words, one must limit the
propertization of information but still use property as the underlying regime to protect that information.
See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2058 (2004)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Personal Data] (seeking to “develop a model for propertization of personal data
that will fully safeguard information privacy”). Schwartz has argued for the propertization of personal
information under certain constraints. One constraint is that data collectors should be able and required
to distinguish between consumers with different privacy preferences. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1687 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Cyberspace]. In addition, Schwartz has called for use-transfer restrictions. In Schwartz’s proposal, an individual would be free to transfer his or her own information but only if the individual could easily block
further downstream transfers from the data collector to other third parties. See Schwartz, Personal Data,
supra, at 2060.
146
See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 383 (2003) (“[I]n order to protect privacy, individuals must secure control over their personal information by becoming its real owners.”); Adam D. Moore, Toward
Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809 (2007) (arguing for increased informational
privacy rights due to data aggregation and data mining).
147
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2000) (arguing for legislation to create such property rights); Solove &
Hoofnagle, supra note 109, at 358 (emphasizing personal control over information).
148
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen,
89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2043 (2001) (“[I]t is becoming increasingly clear that the common law invasion of
privacy torts will not help to contain the destruction of informational privacy.”); A. Michael Froomkin,
The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000) (arguing that tort law is of limited utility in combating threats to informational privacy).
149
See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2003) (discussing proliferation of data mining and arguing that profile collection without consent should be tortious).
150
Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal Information,
66 MD. L. REV. 140, 146 (2006) (proposing an expansion of privacy tort law along fair information practices to “remed[y] the harm to an individual caused by his loss of control over his identity”).
151
Citron, supra note 141.
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control over the use of the information they share in important relationships.152
Proposed legislative solutions also emphasize control rights. As Fred
Cate has noted, “Virtually all privacy bills before Congress reflect this goal:
‘to strengthen control by consumers’ and ‘to provide greater individual control.’”153 Prescriptive informational privacy scholarship follows this pattern.
Robert Sprague and Corey Ciocchetti, for example, have argued for legislation to enhance control over personal information by requiring private firms
to adopt strict privacy policies.154 Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle have
proposed model legislation for regulating data brokers to improve the rights
of individuals155 and for making personal information inaccessible to data
miners.156 Susan Gindin has argued for a comprehensive legislative approach to improving control.157
I do not disagree that control over information is important. In fact, the
personal prospectus as a signaling device is only possible when individuals
have control over personal information. But control is insufficient to protect privacy in an economy with low-cost signaling and the threat of unraveling. As a practical matter, unraveling simply undermines the privacy
field’s focus on control. Privacy advocates have not sought control just to
have the right to keep information secret; they have sought control so that
individuals have the actual ability to keep information to themselves. It
would be a meaningless victory if the informational privacy field delivered
the right to control one’s information only for individuals to realize that
they had no real power to do so in a signaling economy in which the stigma
of staying silent requires everyone to disclose.
2. Beyond Control?.—At this point I must pause and respond briefly
to the core group of privacy scholars that has attempted to liberate the concept of privacy and its protection from the constraints of control and consent. Their reaction should and likely will take the following form: “We
152

See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007).
153
CATE, supra note 115, at 5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting various privacy bills).
154
Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 130 (2009).
155
See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 109, at 357. Their proposal covers many specific problems
and solutions. Almost all, however, are grounded in improving notice and control.
156
Hoofnagle has argued, for example, that credit-report information should be “frozen”—taken out
of the public realm and made private, in the control of individuals. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Putting
Identity Theft on Ice: Freezing Credit Reports to Prevent Lending to Impostors, in SECURING PRIVACY
IN THE INTERNET AGE 207, 214–216 (Anupam Chander, Lauren Gelman & Margaret Jane Radin eds.,
2008) (“Before credit could be granted, individuals would have to ‘thaw’ their credit by contacting a
credit reporting agency and requesting release of the report.”).
157
Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1997) (“[A] comprehensive federal policy is needed which will
guarantee individuals the right to control the collection and distribution of their personal information.”).
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agree that privacy as control is inherently flawed; we have argued as much
for a decade. We have tried to move the concept of privacy well beyond
control and individual consent, reconceptualizing it in various ways as a social good that deserves protection for reasons beyond individual welfare.
You are tilting at windmills in fallow fields we have long abandoned.”158
New privacy scholarship has done much to deepen our understanding
of what “control” really requires, what privacy is, and why privacy deserves
protection, but it has not fundamentally abandoned the idea that privacy involves control over one’s information, nor the associated assumption that
once an individual has such control, her later choice “voluntarily” to disclose such information poses no threat to privacy. Three aspects of this
scholarship—and of the new approaches to privacy that it represents—
undermine the argument that it has moved beyond control in ways that will
prevent unraveling.
First, much new privacy scholarship has attacked existing consent
processes as insufficiently protective of an individual’s control over information.159 It has pointed to the market failures in Internet information exchange that make consent to disclosure largely meaningless.160 Websites
post privacy notices that are opaque and that consumers rarely read or understand. Users click through consent forms without hesitation and often
without regard for the broad rights that they are ceding to data collectors.161
In short, “control” over one’s information is relinquished too easily through
implied or uninformed consent.162
Prescriptively, these scholars have sought to correct these market failures,163 often by turning to Fair Information Practices (or Principles) (FIPs)
158

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 148, at 2039 (“Modern privacy advocates . . . conceive of privacy as
a species of constitutive freedom and view that freedom as both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable.”); Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2163, 2177
(2003) (reviewing JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001)) (“These authors . . . [working on new definitions of privacy] have sought to
develop a normative basis for an information privacy law based not in a right of ‘individual control’
over information, but in the idea of privacy as a social good.”).
159
For a description of these problems, see Max Stul Oppenheimer, Internet Cookies: When Is
Permission Consent?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 383 (2006).
160
See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1181–82 (2009) (discussing statistics on how few users read or understand privacy policies). Privacy scholars have also described the weakness of consent regimes in non-Internet contexts. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 49 (1997) (describing the “shallow consent process” in health care disclosure releases).
161
See Cohen, supra note 148, at 2041 (describing ways in which consent functions to strip users of
privacy rights with little information or real control).
162
See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 825 (“[P]rivacy-consent neglects the actual conditions of choice
regarding the processing of personal information, and permits notice to become an alibi for ‘take-it-orleave-it’ data processing.”).
163
See Schwartz, Personal Data, supra note 145, at 2082 (“The goal of market-perfecting policies
should be to reform the failed privacy market to reflect more completely the varying value of personal
data to individuals with different preferences about whether and how that data should be used.”).
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to protect information. FIPs generally require that data collection, aggregation, and storage be transparent, disclosed to individuals, secure, accurate,
and limited in duration.164 In addition, FIPs require that an individual’s consent to disclosure be informed and that the individual have some ability to
control downstream uses of that disclosed information in the future.165
Using FIPs to improve information markets by legislating datahandling and disclosure standards would undoubtedly be helpful. These
steps would protect consumers against the worst excesses of data mining
and dissemination.166 But FIPs cannot, ultimately, stop unraveling. All
FIPs contain provisions for voluntary, consensual disclosure of information167 because FIPs are ultimately designed to be autonomy-enhancing.168
FIPs are meant to remedy the market failure of uninformed, false consent
but not to stop disclosure completely.169 FIPs therefore open the door to the
unraveling of privacy because, in a signaling economy, even fully informed
consumers may find themselves disclosing to counter the negative assumptions attached to silence.
Second, these scholars have attempted to redefine the concept of privacy as something other than individual information control. Paul Schwartz
has argued that privacy should instead be thought of as a “constitutive value” and protected because it is one of the ways in which both individuals
164

There are many descriptions of FIPs. See, e.g., Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 158, at 2181
(“Although the expression of FIPs . . . will vary in details, . . . a formulation with nine elements is possible: (1) defined limits . . . for processors of personal information (purpose specification); (2) processing
systems that the concerned individual can understand (transparent processing systems); (3) notice to the
individual; (4) individual choice or consent regarding the further use of her personal information;
(5) security for stored data; (6) limits on data retention; (7) data quality (accurate and timely information); (8) access to one’s personal data; and (9) enforcement of privacy rights and standards . . . .”).
165
See Avner Levin & Patricia Sánchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 1001, 1009 (2009) (“The overall purpose of FIPs is to ensure that an individual will maintain
control over his personal information when it is in the hands of an organization.”).
166
Schwartz’s approach is to treat information as property but build inalienabilities into the definition of the property right to limit downstream transfers of the information to third parties. See Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269, 1271
(2005) (“[T]his model would permit the transfer of personal data for an initial category of use, but only
if the customer is granted an opportunity to block further transfer . . . .”). For a critique of FIPs, see
Beales & Muris, supra note 58, at 114, which criticizes FIPs as irrelevant because consumers do not inform themselves about privacy notices and avoid decisionmaking about privacy policies.
167
See LESSIG, supra note 51, at 228 (“These principles express important substantive values—for
example, that data not be reused beyond an original consent, or that systems for gathering data be reliable—but they don’t interfere with an individual’s choice to release his or her data for specified purposes.”).
168
See, e.g., Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 158, at 2164 (“The new privacy is centered around
Fair Information Practices (‘FIPs’) and is intended to prevent threats to autonomy.”).
169
In some cases they do not achieve even this goal: notice and consent FIPs may lead only to an
avalanche of privacy policies with little real control or consent by users. See Fred H. Cate, The Failure
of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION
ECONOMY’ 341, 364 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (“Notice and consent requirements often create the illusion, but not the reality, of meaningful consumer choice.”).
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and society are created and maintained.170 Privacy is of value because it
protects and is necessary for both the individual’s self-determination and
society’s deliberative democracy.171 Without it, individuals cannot equip
themselves adequately to participate in a democratic collective. Julie Cohen has similarly argued that autonomy requires “insulation from outside
scrutiny” so that the individual can construct a self, which is of benefit not
only to the individual but to the collective as well.172 Solove has followed a
similar line.173
There is a valuable theoretical shift here. The argument of these privacy scholars is not just that market failures hurt the individual but also that
privacy is a social good with social implications. Thus, protecting privacy
rests not only on respect for individual autonomy but also on social welfare
concerns about the prerequisites for a functioning polity. Under these definitions, privacy would still matter even if market-perfecting strategies eliminated information market failures.174
Yet it is important to recognize the limitations of this redefinition.
None of these scholars has argued that privacy is exclusively a social good
or constitutive value; each has recognized that individuals should retain the
ability to control their information for their own ends. In other words, although the new privacy scholarship has added a definitional layer to privacy
to justify its protection and regulation beyond the confines of autonomyand control-enhancing arguments, it has not abandoned the notion that individuals do and should remain the locus of decisionmaking about their personal data. For example, Schwartz ultimately accepts that data users will
incentivize data holders to disclose information. Indeed, he hopes that real
consent will “create[] an entitlement in personal information and place[]
pressure on the data collector to induce the individual to surrender it.”175 At
a practical level, therefore, these scholars continue to assume that individuals should be able to alienate their information so long as that alienation is
informed and voluntary. That assumption opens the door to unraveling.
Finally, this scholarship has continued to define “voluntary” information disclosure as not being a privacy problem or harm. Although scholars
have noted the problem that commodification (or propertization) of infor-

170

Schwartz, supra note 21, at 834.
See Schwartz, Cyberspace, supra note 145, at 1646–47.
172
Cohen, supra note 147, at 1424.
173
See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 140, at 92 (“Privacy protects aspects of individuality that have a high social value; it protects individuals not merely for their sake but for the sake
of society.”).
174
See Schwartz, Personal Data, supra note 145, at 2088 (“[A] negative result for the privacy
commons can occur both under privacy market failure and under a functioning market for personal data
trade.”).
175
Id. at 2103.
171
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mation leads to pressure to trade away that information,176 many in the informational privacy field have nevertheless assumed that no privacy harm
occurs if an individual chooses to disclose information.177 Privacy law is
grounded in classical liberal conceptions of autonomy and individualism. It
assumes that invasions of privacy are damaging to autonomy and that control over information will reestablish that autonomy. What an individual
does after securing control of her information is no longer a privacy issue.
As Amitai Etzioni put it,
[T]he classical liberal view of a person [is] as a free agent who knows his or
her preferences and is able to act on them rationally. It reflects the ideology
that to the extent that shared, inter-individual arrangements are necessary, they
ought to be based on voluntary agreements or contracts between individuals—
hence the notion of consent. Privacy is not violated, accordingly, if [individuals] freely consent to disclosure of information about themselves . . . .178

Defining privacy harm to exclude voluntary disclosure has therefore been
comfortable because it squares with dominant assumptions about autonomy.
But conceding that all voluntary disclosures are beyond the bounds of
privacy harm is conceding too much. To date there have been no practical
consequences of this limited definition of what constitutes a privacy harm
because there has been no real threat of unraveling. In a signaling economy, however, privacy law must wrestle with whether volunteering information under the pressure of the unraveling effect is truly voluntary.179
Perhaps those with the best private information can be said to have suffered
no harm in such circumstances, but what about the rest? If disclosure results solely from the pressure to defend against the inaccuracies of the digital dossier or in response to unraveling, does that not constitute a privacy
problem? To the extent that privacy scholars are concerned about the
broader social costs of sorting and weblining, they should see the personal
prospectus and the threat of unraveling as a threat to privacy.
Articulating the exact harm of coerced disclosure is difficult. On the
one hand, critics might argue that the bad driver or unhealthy insured has no
“right” to keep her information private and thereby free ride on the safe and
healthy in an insurance pool; that if unraveling puts pressure on those at the
bottom of a pool to disclose, that will lead to more allocative efficiencies
and be socially optimal. On the other hand, there are certain costs to unraveling. First, it does not feel good to be “unraveled upon.” A student shared
176

See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 830 (“The idea that one has a right to control her data leads inexorably to the concept of a trade in personal information.”).
177
See, e.g., Calo, supra note 141, at 1148 (“It is not a privacy harm to use a person’s information
if . . . he understood and agreed to the use.”).
178
AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 155 (1999).
179
See, e.g., Calo, supra note 141, at 1150–52 (acknowledging that disclosure can be coerced and
that coercion exists along a spectrum such that in some circumstances one’s decision to volunteer information can be tantamount to coercion).
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with me the anecdote that she was very frustrated to discover that a female
peer was telling all potential employers during interviews that she did not
wish to have children in the next five years. This disclosure put pressure on
all female candidates in the pool to say something similar for fear that silence would be interpreted adversely. She felt invaded by her peer’s disclosure, which seemed strategic and which forced her to share (or distort)
information she otherwise would not.
The idea that putatively voluntary disclosure can sometimes constitute
privacy harm is relatively radical, however. As Cohen has argued, “the unfettered use of ‘true’ information to predict risk and minimize uncertainty is
a hallmark of the liberal state and its constituent economic and political
markets.”180 The need for rationalizing information to price risk, sort consumers, and the like both drives invasive maneuvers to access information
like the digital dossier and leads to attempts to induce its disclosure like the
personal prospectus. Redefining such disclosure as a privacy harm—at
least in some circumstances—counters this inherent tendency and the assumption behind it that more information is almost always of social benefit.
III. UNRAVELING’S LIMITS AND LIMITING UNRAVELING
Let us summarize the argument to this point. Verifiable signals theoretically lead to unraveling as all individuals in a pool find it in their selfinterest to disclose at first for measurable economic gain and eventually to
avoid the stigma attached to silence. The informational privacy field has
largely ignored the threat of signaling. This has had little consequence to
date because sorting dominated the economy; signaling remained nascent
because low-cost verification was impossible. Signaling is becoming low
cost, however, thanks to digital monitoring of directly observable data and
digital access to directly verifiable data. Therefore, serious attention to the
problem of privacy’s unraveling is required.
This Part takes up that challenge. I do not advocate for a draft statute
or call for the creation of a new regulatory agency. The unraveling effect
permits neither simple nor comprehensive solutions. Instead, I explore
three foundational issues for the informational privacy field as it considers
confronting unraveling. First, what are the known limits of the unraveling
effect, and will those limits aid in preventing privacy’s unraveling in a signaling economy? Second, in what ways can the law curtail or prevent unraveling, and will they protect privacy? Third, will privacy advocates be
able to muster sufficient support for such legal constraints on unraveling?
Throughout, I take the threat of unraveling seriously without assuming
that it necessarily results in the end of privacy. There are ways to dampen
its effects, and privacy scholarship must focus more intently on those dampening mechanisms. Nonetheless, privacy advocates should be sobered by
180
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the rise of a signaling economy: the personal prospectus complicates informational privacy both in theory and in practice.
A. Limits on Unraveling
One possible counterargument at this point could focus on the known
limits of the unraveling effect. Not all information markets unravel. Instead, unraveling is limited by transaction costs, ignorance of desired information, inability to accurately make negative inferences, and social
norms. This section explores what we know about the limits of the unraveling effect.181 It may provide some reassurance for privacy advocates who
are hopeful that unraveling will not occur. Ultimately, however, I conclude
that most of the known limits on unraveling will do little to preserve privacy in the evolving signaling economy.
1. Transaction Costs.—Research shows that unraveling may be partial or incomplete when it is costly to disclose information,182 costly to acquire it,183 or difficult for the informed party to credibly communicate the
information to her uninformed counterpart.184 There are no surprises here—
the ability to signal at low cost is the precondition for the unraveling effect.
If signals are cost-prohibitive to send or receive or if no verifiable signals
exist,185 unraveling cannot occur.
A recent study of the online auto auction site eBay Motors demonstrated, for example, that the cost of disclosure affects how much a seller will
post in an online auction and therefore also affects the functioning of the
market.186 Some information relevant to such an auction is easily disclosed
ex ante and easily verified ex post. Pictures of the car’s exterior condition,
for example, fall into this category. This information unravels towards full
disclosure—sellers disclose such pictures because it is low cost to do so, the
181

This section reviews some of the main constraints on unraveling. For an overview including
other constraints, see David Dranove & Ginger Zhe Jin, Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory
and Practice (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15644, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1537763.
182
See Boyan Jovanovic, Truthful Disclosure of Information, 13 BELL J. ECON. 36 (1982) (explaining that transaction costs inhibit the effect).
183
See Farrell, supra note 133.
184
See, e.g., Steven Shavell, A Note on the Incentive to Reveal Information, 14 GENEVA PAPERS ON
RISK & INS. 66 (1989) (exploring distinction between unraveling with verifiable versus unverifiable information).
185
It is worth noting that in some instances the lack of verifiability does not necessarily prevent unraveling. In some markets, early disclosures begin with those seeking to signal enthusiasm or willingness to cooperate even if they cannot directly signal their overall quality. See Sam-Ho Lee, Jumping the
Curse: Early Contracting with Private Information in University Admissions, 50 INT’L ECON. REV. 1, 3–
4 (2009) (analyzing early college admissions data and arguing that although admissions officers cannot
directly observe student quality, they accept greater numbers of early applicants to identify enthusiasts).
186
See Gregory Lewis, Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The
Case of eBay Motors, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1535 (2011).
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photographic representation of the car is verifiable when the buyer takes
possession, and the failure to post such photos is therefore taken as a signal
that there is something to hide.187 The author of the study noted that
“[w]here bandwidth and technology are available to tightly define the contract between buyer and seller through rich media such as photos and videos, adverse selection problems are mitigated.”188 As disclosure costs
increase, however, disclosure does not occur.
This suggests that the unraveling of privacy is unlikely to be quick or
uniform across information contexts. The costs of signaling are dropping in
some areas as technologies make verifiable disclosure much less expensive.
Health monitoring is one example; monitoring of employees and equipment
is another. In other areas, costs may come down more slowly. The second
component of the personal prospectus—digital access to directly verifiable
data—may take longer to evolve across the economy, and it is difficult to
predict how the costs of the infrastructure needed to produce such real-time
verified access to information will be distributed. If an individual ties her
personal prospectus to her employer’s database, the employer must expend
resources to answer queries about her employment record. Similarly, if a
personal prospectus is tied to a government database (e.g., criminal history
or tax records), the state will be asked to subsidize the verified sharing of
that information. Who will pay for such data structures and processes? As
these questions are worked out across the economy, some information may
not be available to the personal prospectus. In such domains in which disclosure costs remain high, unraveling may not occur or may be delayed.
The argument of Parts I and II suggests, however, that as a general
proposition the costs of signaling are decreasing and therefore the threat of
unraveling is increasing. These transaction cost constraints therefore offer
limited reassurance if one fears the unraveling of privacy.
2. Unverifiability of Ignorance.—Some types of information are inherently difficult to verify not because of the transaction costs involved,
which a signaling economy may overcome, but rather because the information type makes verifiability impossible. Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Andrew Postlewaite, and Kotaro Suzumura revealed this problem.189 They
explained it in the context of the crate of oranges example discussed in the
Introduction. Imagine that the seller is ignorant of the number of oranges in
the crate.190 Assume that there is no way for the seller to certify his ignorance to the buyer. He cannot prove that he does not know the number of
187

Id.
Id. at 1546.
189
See Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Andrew Postlewaite & Kotaro Suzumura, Strategic Information
Revelation, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 25, 27 (1990) (“[O]ur paper emphasizes how restrictive are the conditions which guarantee the revelation of information in equilibrium.”).
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See id. at 45 (explaining that one type of unverifiable information is “a case in which [a] person’s type might correspond to his not knowing something”).
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oranges. Nor could a court or other outside reviewer easily prove that negative. As a result, the buyer cannot know whether to draw a negative inference from the seller’s silence. If the seller remains quiet, is it because
there are few oranges in the crate or because the seller is merely ignorant of
the number of oranges? This may lead to those with “good” information
disclosing but not to a complete unraveling of all sellers’ information.191
A similar but more general constraint occurs merely if the uninformed
party does not know the kind of information held by the informed party. A
buyer must know that the seller has information about product quality before product quality can unravel towards full disclosure.192 For example,
restaurants did not typically disclose health reports until required by law to
do so because consumers did not seem to realize that the restaurants had
such reports on hand. Similarly, if a buyer does not know that a used car
salesman has information about recent repairs to a car, the buyer cannot
draw negative inferences from the salesman’s silence.193
These ignorance constraints do not seem likely to dampen the potential
unraveling of privacy by the personal prospectus although they may have
some effect. In most relevant instances of individual-to-individual interaction or consumer-to-firm exchange, there is common knowledge194 that the
individual has information of a certain type. An insurance company knows
that you know how much junk food you eat, and you know they know that
you know. A car rental company knows that you know how fast you are
driving and where you are going. An employer knows that you know
whether you were at work during a given time period or whether your educational qualifications are represented properly on your resume. There is no
ignorance constraint in such contexts.
3. Inability to Accurately Infer a Negative.—Another possible constraint is whether the uninformed can accurately draw negative inferences
from nondisclosure. Michael Fishman and Kathleen Hagerty’s work has
191

See BAIRD, GERTNER & PICKER, supra note 14, at 95 (“Unraveling may not occur (or will not be
complete) if there is a chance that a player has never acquired the relevant information. In such a case,
one will not be able to tell whether players are silent because they do not have the relevant information
or because they have the information but do not wish to reveal it.”).
192
See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND
J. ECON. 18, 19–20 (1986) (“If the interested party has known monotone preferences over the decisionmaker’s choice set (e.g., a seller wants to sell as much as possible, an electric utility company prefers
less restrictive emissions standards) and has information that bears on the decisionmaker’s preferences,
and if the decisionmaker knows what information to seek, then (i) the decisionmaker’s unique equilibrium strategy is to assume the worst . . . and (ii) the equilibrium decision is the full-information decision . . . .”).
193
See id. at 20 (using this example and noting that “the decisionmaker must know the factors about
which the interested party has information to detect situations in which information is being withheld”).
194
BAIRD, GERTNER & PICKER, supra note 14, at 304 (“Something is common knowledge if it is
known to each player, and, in addition, each player knows that the other player has this knowledge;
knows that the other person knows the player knows it; and so forth.”).
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shown, for example, that for unraveling to occur the uninformed receiver of
signaled information must be able to understand the disclosed information
and actually draw negative inferences from nondisclosure.195 If consumers
do not draw negative inferences from silence, sellers have no incentive to
disclose product information.196 Some have suggested that this explains the
failure of most hospitals to disclose evaluations of their quality—patients
seem to naïvely believe that their doctors are above average even without
disclosure, and therefore unraveling does not get started.197 More generally,
unsophisticated actors may not think strategically and may be naïvely credulous. If informed sellers believe this, for example, they will fail to disclose and will treat every buyer as if he is unsophisticated.198 Only when
the uninformed parties in a market consist of a sufficient number of sophisticated players will unraveling occur and force disclosure by informed parties.
In addition, some information types make it hard to draw negative inferences accurately, and therefore informed parties may not fully disclose. In
one landmark study, Alan Mathios examined why some salad dressing
manufacturers failed to provide nutritional information before being required to do so by law.199 In theory, no mandatory disclosure law should
have been necessary. The unraveling effect primarily requires that disclosures be truthful, that is, that a seller cannot lie about product quality. The
law need not require full disclosure to produce it.200 Instead, in a competitive market truthfulness can lead to full disclosure as high-value or highquality individuals signal their quality early, beginning the unraveling.
Mathios compared salad dressing labeling before and after the passage
of the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA).201 He found that
195

See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in
Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45 (2003).
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See Joel Huber & John McCann, The Impact of Inferential Beliefs on Product Evaluations, 19 J.
MARKETING RES. 324 (1982) (studying consumer skepticism in the absence of disclosure about product
characteristics); Richard D. Johnson & Irwin P. Levin, More Than Meets the Eye: The Effect of Missing
Information on Purchase Evaluations, 12 J. CONSUMER RES. 169 (1985).
197
See DAVID DRANOVE, CODE RED 91 (2008) (calling this “Lake Woebegone Syndrome”).
198
See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 192, at 20 (“[A] rational salesman will treat every buyer as
if he were naively credulous.”).
199
See Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651 (2000); see also Rebecca S. Fribush, Note,
Putting Calorie and Fat Counts on the Table: Should Mandatory Nutritional Disclosure Laws Apply to
Restaurant Foods?, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 377 (2005) (extending theory to restaurant disclosures).
200
Mandatory disclosure versus voluntary or unraveling disclosure is a hugely debated topic.
Grossman began the discussion. See Grossman, supra note 131. Others have continued the debate. See
Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 223.
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Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)).
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before the NLEA, when labeling was voluntary, low-fat dressings consistently used nutrition labels but those with more fat did not. He attributed
this finding to the fact that a consumer may have difficulty assigning a negative weight to the undisclosed fat content, because it is theoretically unbounded. If all dressings with fewer than ten grams of fat have labels and
all above ten grams do not, any given unlabelled dressing could have from
eleven grams to infinity. “For a nutrient with negative health consequences,
consumers must infer how inferior is the product from the worst of the disclosed products, and economic theory cannot accurately bound this
amount.”202 In other words, very high-fat dressings can hide in a pool with
moderately high-fat dressings because at some point consumers fail to distinguish between them and the costs of differentiating may outweigh the
benefits.
Positive characteristics, in contrast, are all likely to be disclosed because there is a natural lower bound of zero. Thus, if a product contains a
nutrient with positive health consequences, all manufacturers of such products will likely disclose the amount of said nutrient. Failure to disclose will
lead to the assumption that none of the nutrient is present.
These results suggest that privacy may not completely unravel because
of the personal prospectus. Even if those with the very best traits disclose
fully, not everyone may be forced to follow. At some point market participants may stop drawing the negative inferences needed to drive unraveling,
and therefore the very worst may be able to pool together with the remaining middle of the set of persons, products, or firms in question. Economic
theory cannot predict when exactly this will occur: it is an empirical question dependent on the specifics of the given market. But this suggests that
in some instances the equilibrium may allow some market participants with
less than ideal information to keep that information private.203
Yet this is little consolation. In many of the examples discussed here,
the uninformed players are homogeneous in their sophistication, and they
are seeking information that is bounded in some fashion. We can assume
that insurance carriers, for example, are sophisticated and will draw negative inferences from insureds’ silence. Further, they seek positive information about health characteristics or behaviors that is not subject to Mathios’s
boundedness problem: for example, whether a given insured smoker keeps
her blood glucose below a certain level. Note the potential asymmetry,
however, this suggests between consumers and firms—although firms may
typically unravel consumers’ privacy, consumers may not necessarily force
disclosure by firms if one assumes that consumers are not homogeneously
sophisticated in their game theoretic inferences.
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Mathios, supra note 199, at 674.
Even so, the participants with less than ideal information will still be lumped together with the
others at the bottom of the particular quality spectrum.
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4. Norms.—Finally, privacy norms sometimes develop that constrain
unraveling. Judge Posner gives the example of the market for physical attractiveness. Beautiful people have an obvious incentive to reveal their attractiveness by wearing little or no clothing whenever possible. In an
unraveling of sorts, those who remain covered should be assumed to be less
desirable.204 In equilibrium, everyone should become a nudist. This is not,
of course, the case. The norm against nudity prevents disclosure. This
norm could have developed for many reasons, including the potential inefficiencies of widespread nudity. The point, however, is simply that in some
cases norms prevent unraveling.
A recent study of SAT score disclosure by college applicants seems to
support the notion that norms can constrain disclosure. Over seven hundred
colleges and universities now make disclosure of SAT scores voluntary.
One would expect that this would do little to change the market—those
with high scores should reveal, leading to an unraveling equilibrium and
full disclosure by all applicants. Analysis of actual data by roughly 3000
applicants, however, reveals that although those with the highest scores do
disclose, not all in the middle range do so. Instead, both African-Americans
and female applicants were more likely to withhold their scores even when
the scores were of reasonable, if not the very highest, quality.205 The authors hypothesize that informal norms may have developed among AfricanAmericans and women: in particular, that the SAT test is biased, discriminatory, and unfair. As a result, individual members of these groups may
resist disclosure even when their SAT scores are above average.206
To the extent that informal norms develop against disclosure, privacy
may not unravel completely. Sometimes individuals will incur economic
costs to defend a norm that produces other personal or social benefits, as the
SAT study seems to demonstrate. In most cases, however, privacy norms
seem better at constraining the sharing of information with low economic
value but high prurient interest—for example, gossip or nudity norms.207
Norms are less likely to evolve to protect information that is economically
valuable, particularly when some set of actors will want the ability to disclose such information. As a result, norms do not seem likely to prevent the
unraveling effects of a signaling economy.

204

See POSNER, supra note †, at 107 (discussing this example).
See Gabrielle Chapman, Michael Conlin & Stacy Dickert-Conlin, The Economics of Voluntary
Disclosure in SAT Scores (Aug. 17, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.msu.edu/
~dickertc/301f06/SAT.pdf.
206
See id. at 17.
207
See Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,
2279–82 (1996) (describing norms against disclosing or asking for information that has little social function beyond being titillating gossip).
205

1196

105:1153 (2011)

Unraveling Privacy

B. Limiting Unraveling: Comparing Regulatory Strategies for Preserving
Privacy
Privacy advocates can take some reassurance from these limits: unraveling may be slow and lumpy across the economy as disclosure costs
drop differently in different contexts; some contexts may experience only
partial unraveling; norms may sometimes counter unraveling. But this review of the empirical limits of the unraveling effect generally reinforces
Part II’s argument that privacy is increasingly threatened by signaling. Privacy advocates must therefore turn to the legal constraints that might prevent unraveling.
1. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell?208.—Inquiry limits and disclosure limits
(“don’t ask” rules and “don’t tell” rules) are often used to protect personally
or socially sensitive information.209 Inquiry limits forbid an uninformed
party from seeking information from an informed counterpart.210 For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) forbids an employer to ask
a potential employee about disabilities,211 and the regulations implementing
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 similarly forbid inquiry
about marital status by employers. Likewise, various states bar inquiries
about religious or political affiliations during the hiring process.212
Inquiry limits rarely seem to inhibit unraveling, however.213 Economists have long recognized that the unraveling effect will typically render
an inquiry limit ineffective. Robert Frank considers the problem of employment discrimination regulations:
208

A related option is “don’t know” rules. In some instances, the best means to prevent unraveling
is to never learn or store the information to begin with. Some have suggested using technology to limit
an individual’s ability to disclose information, for example. James D. Miller and Lixin Gao propose that
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other words, by encrypting the information even as against its author, one would eliminate the negative
inference that the public would draw in the event that it sought access to the diary but was denied. See
James D. Miller & Lixin Gao, Creating a Subpoena-Proof Diary: A Technological Solution to a Legal
Problem, 3 J. INFO. L. & TECH. (2001), http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2001_3/miller.
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The most infamous example of a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy was the military’s stance towards
homosexual and bisexual service members. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
210
Gertner, supra note 14, at 605 (“Inquiry limits are legal rules that try to restrict the ability of an
uninformed party to ask for disclosure from informed parties.”).
211
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4)(A) (2006).
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See BAIRD, GERTNER & PICKER, supra note 14, at 92 (discussing these examples).
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See id. (“Inquiry limits . . . may be ineffective unless there is some mechanism that prevents voluntary disclosure of the information.”).
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Consider . . . legislation that prohibits employers from asking about marital
status and plans for having children. . . . [I]t is not sufficient merely to prohibit
employers from asking about demographic categories. For if a woman realizes
that her own particular situation places her in the most favored hiring category,
she has every incentive to volunteer the relevant information. This sets up the
familiar unraveling process whereby all but the least favorable information
will eventually be volunteered freely by job candidates. The candidate who
fails to volunteer information, however unfavorable, is simply assumed to be
in the least favorable category. If the legislation were to achieve its desired intent, it would somehow have to prohibit job candidates from volunteering the
information at issue.214

This sort of unraveling is exactly what one finds in job markets. Empirical
examination of resumes shows that job candidates very often reveal information to potential employers that they need not, probably to signal traits
that they perceive will assist them in their quest for employment.215
Given this problem, there are contexts in which we deploy disclosure
limits. We forbid banks and bank examiners from discussing bank examinations publicly, for example, for fear that unraveling will weaken the
banking system when it is already under stress.216 The unraveling problem
is obvious: banks with good reports will disclose their relative health; the
public will run to those banks; this will damage less healthy banks that
might have been able to survive with assistance but cannot survive the
flight of their customers. Unraveling would impose serious social costs,
and we have therefore limited disclosure of this information.
It is difficult to imagine strong disclosure limits as a comprehensive solution to the unraveling of privacy, however. The banking context is a
somewhat unique circumstance. Banks are highly regulated entities already
subject to a host of disclosure and information constraint rules. By contrast,
individuals, who are protected by the First Amendment, are unused to such
micromanaging of their speech. It would be bizarre and unconstitutional,
for example, to forbid self-disclosure on one’s resume. In addition, the social costs at stake are high in the banking context. It is not clear that the social justifications for limiting disclosure are as salient or pressing in most of
the informational privacy contexts discussed to this point. In fact, in many
cases signaling permits allocative efficiencies. It is hard to imagine how
one would overcome the constitutional and social objections that would be
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raised were one to broadly prohibit individuals from sharing their personal
information.
In addition, even were one to impose broad disclosure limits to protect
information, there are sometimes other signals that interested actors can use
to communicate the same information without violating the disclosure limit.
A recent study of need-blind college admissions policies demonstrates this
problem.217 Various elite colleges and universities publicly proclaim that
they admit on a need-blind basis. They do not ask about financial need and
do not accept applications that disclose it. Nevertheless, the schools have
obvious economic interest in not admitting too many financially needy applicants, for fear of overwhelming the schools’ scholarship funds. To endrun around the don’t ask, don’t tell regime, schools may simply admit a disproportionate number of early admissions applicants. Admissions officers
know that those needing financial aid are less likely to apply for early decision because the binding early decision process prevents them from comparing financial aid packages across different universities. Schools can
therefore limit their exposure to need-blind admissions policies while maintaining their public commitment to being need-blind by disproportionately
admitting early applicants.
This secondary signaling would likely also occur were we to adopt
widespread limits on inquiry and disclosure to prevent unraveling in health
care, car insurance, employment decisions, and elsewhere. When both sides
of an information exchange have an incentive to share a verifiable piece of
information and can do so at low cost, it is difficult to prevent them from
finding some means to transmit such a signal.
2. Don’t Use?.—This leaves privacy advocates with rules that restrict
the use of information, regardless of how it has been shared. “Don’t use”
rules prohibit a decisionmaker from considering certain information even if
that information is relevant to the decision. Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, for example, requires a judge to order a jury not to draw negative inferences from a defendant’s failure to testify.218 The Fair Credit Reporting
Act219 bars creditors from inquiring about or denying credit on the basis of
bankruptcies more than ten years old.220 Some states have limited car rental
companies from using data from GPS monitors to penalize consumers.221
And our health care statutes limit an insurer’s use of information about an
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insured’s medical condition when the insurer is setting coverage or premiums.222
More recently, Congress has enacted a powerful “don’t use” rule to
prevent information unraveling in the context of genetic discrimination.223
Individuals in possession of good genetic test results have an incentive to
reveal that information to insurers; insurers will then lump together those
who make no such disclosures as being of greater risk.224 Although some
scholars have advocated for the efficiencies of total disclosure,225 privacy
and health advocates have long sought to prevent the use of genetic information by an insurer as a basis for adjusting insurance premiums or making
coverage decisions.226 The 2008 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act (GINA) is one example: it bars the use of genetic information by insurers to prevent unraveling.227
Don’t use rules are more likely to constrain unraveling than don’t ask
or don’t tell rules. They are the best means for privacy advocates that wish
to prevent or constrain unraveling. At the same time, don’t use rules are often difficult to enact. Congress considered GINA for over a decade, and
even after its enactment many doubt whether the enforcing regulations will
really be able to prevent the use of genetic information completely. Such
rules are inherently paternalistic. They rest on a social judgment that even
if transacting parties both wish to reveal and use a particular piece of information, its use should be forbidden because of some social harm, such as
discriminating against those with genetic disorders, that is greater than the
social benefits, such as the allocative and contractual efficiency created by
allowing freedom of contract. It is no surprise that these examples of strong
don’t use rules arise in the context of racial, gender, and genetic discrimination—areas in which there are strong legislative sentiments, galvanized political will, and the social consensus that discrimination based on these
immutable characteristics should be prevented. These rules were not the result of privacy debates so much as the result of debates over the social costs
of discrimination generally.
222
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C. The Public Choice Problems of Limiting Unraveling
This brings us to our final and perhaps most fundamental discussion:
does the informational privacy field have any practical chance of countering
unraveling effects in a signaling economy? The informational privacy field
has lamented the difficulties of enacting legislative privacy reforms.228
There is no comprehensive federal privacy statute, and state statutes are erratic and incomplete.229 Despite many legislative proposals by scholars and
privacy advocates, they have not garnered legislative support. These proposals have focused on increasing individual control over information to
protect privacy against the threat of the digital dossier. 230 These control
proposals have largely failed.
The implications of this history are ambiguous. On the one hand, one
could certainly argue that enacting constraints on signaling and unraveling
will be more difficult than enacting control rights. To agree to control
rights a legislator does not need to face dead-on the paternalism problems
inherent in don’t use rules. Instead, control proposals can hold on to the
chimera that control will give individuals autonomy and the freedom to decide what to do with their private information. This is a relatively comfortable stance, grounded in liberal assumptions about individuality, autonomy,
and alienability. But a signaling economy and the threat of information unraveling undermines this comfortable position, instead requiring difficult
judgments about restricting the use of information regardless of individuals’
desires. One might therefore draw the conclusion that the privacy field’s
inability to even enact comprehensive control reforms suggests that addressing the signaling economy will be next to impossible.
On the other hand, perhaps employing “don’t use” rules to combat
problematic signaling will be easier than control prescriptions in some respects. The privacy field has been ineffective in part because its narrative
about the harms of sorting and the digital dossier is too abstract to whip up
any legislative or public response. The threat has seemed intangible—the
prospect of data aggregators targeting consumers for certain products or
more accurately assessing credit risks may not be concrete enough to make
legislators take notice. More bluntly, such descriptions of the digital dossier’s harms may simply not be enough to counter the powerful lobbying
voices of the firms and industries that benefit from increased sorting accuracy.
Intriguingly, however, legislative response to signaling and unraveling
problems has sometimes been relatively quick and decisive. California,
New York, and Connecticut each jumped on the use of GPS-enabled tracking devices by car rental companies after the first consumer complaints be228
229
230
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gan.231 Various states have forbidden employers from requiring employees
to accept subcutaneous RFID tags even before employers had a chance to
experiment with such technology. GINA is now in place, even before
widespread access to genetic information is available to the average consumer. It is easy to imagine legislatures reacting strongly to perceived
abuses or the threat of abuses of home or personal health monitors, smart
grid technology, and other tracking and monitoring devices. These examples suggest that in some contexts the threats created by the signaling economy are more tangible and salient than those of the digital dossier, and thus
perhaps the privacy field may have more success in this new arena than it
has had protecting control over information generally.
The challenge for any regulatory strategy will be overcoming the selfinterest of those that wish to signal their positive characteristics. The most
dramatic difference between this future fight against unraveling and the battle that privacy advocates have fought to date is that to this point the privacy field has been able to frame the digital dossier as firms-versusconsumers. In the world of the digital dossier, unnamed data aggregators
surreptitiously appropriate and use your data to sort you, without your
knowledge and to potentially harmful effect. The legislative contest has
been to galvanize the polity to see this phenomenon as a threat. In the signaling economy, however, the frame must shift. No longer will the debate
merely be firms-versus-consumers; now the contest will turn into consumer-versus-consumer as groups that desire to signal for personal gain will
oppose those seeking to block the use of information for fear of unraveling.
The ability to disclose—even at the risk of unraveling privacy—brings
with it the ability to seek economic advantage. There are distributive stakes
here. As George Stigler has noted,
There is a redistribution of income within a class when classes are made less
homogenous. When it becomes more difficult to measure differences among
individuals, their treatment becomes more uniform. Lower and higher risk
credit are treated as average risk credit, and similarly with the traits of workers, students, and others. It [becomes] a little easier to default on consumer
credit, to embezzle funds, and to shirk duties. A redistribution of income takes
place within the enlarged class.232

Fighting privacy’s unraveling will provoke resistance from those who wish
to be able to distinguish themselves from the average. Those with the
“best” traits or characteristics will sense the redistributive nature of don’t
ask, don’t tell, and don’t use constraints. There will thus be natural constituencies to advocate for disclosure, and those constituencies are likely to
contain the powerful, educated, and affluent. Not only will firms and indus231
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tries seeking information advocate for disclosure, but those consumers that
can attain advantages through disclosure will as well.
In addition, unraveling will be incremental, not sudden. Privacy advocates will undoubtedly find it difficult to articulate clearly why they object
to any one small increase in disclosure, which in isolation may well look
welfare maximizing. Monitoring blood alcohol limits is a good idea to
combat drunk driving, car insurance discounts do provide benefits, and irisscanning or other identity-revelation can prevent and control crime. Together, however, these individual examples of unraveling information combine to create a world in which greater and greater amounts of—perhaps
all—information becomes known or shared. This is the full disclosure future that privacy advocates have questioned, brought about by signaling instead of (or together with) sorting and data mining.
In such a world, opponents of disclosure and signaling will fall into
one of two categories: those with negative traits or information that they
wish to hide and privacy advocates who see some social threat or harm
from disclosure that overwhelms any individual benefit. The first group
will be easy to ignore, at least when the information they seek to protect
does not concern an immutable characteristic like race, gender, or genetics
but instead a behavioral one such as criminal history or educational background. The second group is the informational privacy field itself. It will
face the difficult task of articulating the social harm of unraveling to spur
legislative action.
CONCLUSION
The economy is changing, and privacy law must change as well. I do
not have easy prescriptions to offer—my purpose has been to outline a significant new challenge to privacy. To remain relevant, the field of informational privacy law must address the unraveling problem that has to this
point been merely a theoretical curiosity. The dominant syllogism in privacy theory must yield to new conceptions of privacy interests and to new arguments about why unchecked signaling should be considered a harm. If
privacy advocates fear a future of full disclosure, they must articulate why.
In a signaling economy, they will face even more organized opposition to
restricting information disclosure than they have faced to date. Their task,
in short, is becoming harder, not easier, as the personal prospectus grows,
the signaling economy evolves, and privacy continues unraveling.
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